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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Successful risk management in an offshore oil and gas production platform 
requires accurate and up-to-date probability of occurrence of process safety events. 
Traditional hazard identification and risk assessment techniques such as HAZOP and 
Bow-tie analysis are the well-accepted methods in the oil and gas industry. However, 
these methods cannot effectively cope with dynamic operating environments, which 
continuously affect the estimated probabilities and risks. Factors such as variations in 
operating conditions, equipment deterioration, and personnel competency affect the 
safety barriers’ performances and consequently alter the probability of occurrence of the 
process safety events. In the past decade, Bayesian network has gained significant 
attention in the process safety area because of its ability to include new information. It 
has been integrated with various traditional risk assessment techniques, including 
HAZOP and Bow-tie studies, extending their capabilities to consider operational 
variations and revise the probability of occurrence of the process safety events. 
This research applies Bayesian network to HAZOP and Bow-tie studies for a loss 
of primary containment of high pressure hydrocarbon gas from an export gas compressor 
system. Eleven process safety indicators such as loss of primary containment and 
maintenance backlog are integrated into the models to reflect changes in safety barriers’ 
performances. The integration process is realized by aggregating multiple specific 
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indicators into three element indicators, which are mechanical integrity, operational 
integrity, and personnel integrity. 
The updated probabilities from the developed HAZOP-BN and Bow-tie-BN 
models are considerably different due to dissimilarity in hazard identification approaches 
and the BN development process. However, both models provide consistent results with 
respect to the degree of effect from indicators’ input. Therefore, it is prudent for a 
company to implement the HAZOP-BN or Bow-tie-BN and use process safety indicator 
data to improve its risk assessment capability. Overtime, probability estimation can be 
perfected through integration of additional information with the systematic risk 
assessment method. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
Oil and gas industry plays an important part in our daily life. The fossil resources 
provide not only the energy, but also the raw materials for downstream chemical 
industry to make consumer products such as construction materials, textiles, medicine, 
etc. In the energy industry, the world primary energy production1 increased from 245 
quadrillion BTU in 1973 to 518 quadrillion BTU in 2011, or about 2 percent annual 
growth rate (Basic petroleum data book, petroleum industry statistics, 2015). In 2012, 
the annual oil and gas production of the world accounted for 57% of the total energy 
production with coal, nuclear, hydroelectric, biofuels, and renewable sources adding to 
the rest 43% as shown in Figure 1 (Colombano & Colombano, 2015). According to the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the world consumed 90 million barrels 
of liquid fuels and 120 trillion cubic feet of natural gas each day in 2012 and it is being 
projected that both oil and gas will continue to play an important role in the energy 
industry until 2040 (International Energy Outlook 2016, 2016). 
Fossil fuels provide numerous benefits, but the process of extracting them from 
the ground is complex and involves multiple hazards. In general, oil and gas are 
                                                
 
 
1 Includes only crude oil, lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids, dry natural gas, 
coal, hydroelectric, nuclear, geothermal, solar, wind, wood, and waste electric power 
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produced by drilling into the rock formation until the production zone is reached. In a 
conventional reservoir, an internal pressure of the reservoir is adequate in delivering the 
fluid to processing facility on the surface. Over time, these conventional resources are 
depleted, resulting in the moving of the industry toward enhanced oil recovery and 
nonconventional resources such as deep water, oil sand, and shale gas. The process to 
extract these unconventional resources requires complex tools and sophisticated systems 
to assist hydrocarbons in moving from the porous structure of the rock formation up to 
the processing facility. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Global Energy Production by Sources (Colombano & Colombano, 2015) 
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In the U.S., 30% of crude oil and condensate and 10% of natural gas are 
produced by an offshore section (Basic petroleum data book, petroleum industry 
statistics, 2015). These offshore production facilities tend to have limited space to 
reduce a capital investment. An example offshore production facility is illustrated in 
Figure 2. The congested and confined space impacts separation distances between 
ignition sources and potential areas that may contain flammable materials. As a 
consequence, offshore facilities may present higher process risks, if not properly 
managed, from higher explosion overpressure or evacuation impairment. Other hazards 
associated with oil and gas exploration and production operations include high pressure, 
high temperature, toxic liquid, toxic gas, working at height, transportation, asphyxiation, 
and high noise level. These hazards present a significant risk to the operation that could 
result in personnel injuries, asset damages, and environmental pollutions. Hence, the risk 
needs to be managed in order to prevent a process safety incident and increase 
production efficiency. 
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Figure 2: An Example Offshore Production Facility ("Offshore Production Platform," 
2011) 
 
 
Traditional risk management is performed using hazard or scenario identification 
methods in order to detect high-risk processes and provide adequate risk reduction 
measures. HAZOP and Bow-tie methods were introduced in the early 1970s and 1979, 
respectively, and are well-practiced in the industry today (H. Pasman, 2015a). The 
HAZOP technique is rigorous and thorough in identifying failure scenarios following a 
process line on a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID). Guidewords are applied to 
process parameters resulted in a deviation from the design intent for each system of 
interest. The process is repeated until all the systems are covered. The Bow-tie technique 
is a combination of fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA), where the 
top event acts as a pivot point, connecting the fault tree and event tree together. Each 
Bow-tie represents one top event and multiple threats that could lead to that top event are 
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identified and listed on the left side of the top event. Preventive barriers are added or 
recommended for each threat to inhibit a scenario from developing to the top event. On 
the right side of the top event is the event tree which displays possible consequences that 
may occur following the top event. Likewise, mitigation barriers are provided or 
recommended for each consequence to alleviate or mitigate a consequence once the top 
event has occurred. Although these techniques are comprehensive in the scenario 
identification, their strength makes it difficult to re-evaluate and cope with dynamic 
changes in day-to-day operation such as equipment degradation, weather conditions, and 
barrier deterioration. Completing a typical HAZOP or Bow-tie workshop for an offshore 
central processing facility could take several weeks. In addition, the traditional methods 
do not consider human reliability, safety culture, and near miss data. 
Multiple risk assessments are made along the developmental phase of a project 
and throughout the operational phase of a facility in an attempt to prevent incident as 
shown in Figure 3. Nonetheless, historical data have shown many process safety 
incidents in the past. The World Offshore Accident Database (WOAD) listed over 6,000 
incidents from 1970 to date (DNV, 2016) in which 553 incidents between 1970 and 2007 
resulted in one or more fatalities (IOGP, 2011b). Some of the major offshore incidents 
are: FPSO P-48 fire in the Campos Basin in 2016 ("Petrobras’ FPSO P-48 catches fire," 
2016); Abkatun A platform fire in the Gulf of Mexico in 2016 ("Three dead after fire 
hits Pemex platform again," 2016); Azeri oil rig fire in the Caspian Sea in 2015 
(Antidze, 2015); Mumbai High platform fire and explosion in the Arabian Sea in 2005 
(Daley, 2013); and Piper Alpha fire and explosion in the North Sea in 1988 (CCPS, 
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2005). The Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDAS) provided an even higher 
number for onshore chemical facilities totaling 13,502 incidents between 1970 and 2005 
(IOGP, 2011b). The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), an independent federal agency, 
investigated 93 industrial chemical incidents and provided more than 784 
recommendations. Recently completed investigations include: Macondo blowout and 
explosion in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010; West Fertilizer explosion and fire in 2013; 
Caribbean Petroleum Refining tank explosion and fire in 2009; Horsehead Holding 
Company fatal explosion and fire in 2010; Chevron refinery fire in 2012; Millard 
Refrigerated Services ammonia release in 2010; and US Ink fire in 2012 (CSB, 2016). 
The Macondo blowout incident resulted in 11 fatalities and an almost five million barrels 
of oil spill, which is considered to be the worst oil spill in the U.S. history. The results of 
CSB investigation indicate that preventive maintenance and emergency response and 
planning are among the most wanted safety improvements. These barriers have been 
known by the industry for decades. Thus, it could be deduced that the effectiveness of 
the existing barriers was not being monitored as they ought to, and therefore, creating 
weaknesses in the system. James Reason portrayed the safety barriers as slices of Swiss 
cheese with weaknesses shown as holes in the slices (H. Pasman, 2015a). Multiple holes 
lined up through layers of protection under implementation could eventually lead to an 
incident. 
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Figure 3: Typical Risk Assessment Techniques in Project Life Cycle 
 
 
To ensure safety performances of a facility or a company, process safety 
indicators are also used as a supporting mechanism in process safety management. 
Works have been done to collect process safety lagging indicators, which are seen as the 
precursor to process safety incident. However, these lagging indicators are often zero 
due to low probability of occurrence. Leading indicators have been introduced to address 
status of the safety barriers. The aims were to improve barriers effectiveness and address 
any high potential event before it can escalate into major incident. The Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) listed 350 process safety indicators that the operating 
company can collect to measure its performances (H. Pasman & Rogers, 2014). The 
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) collects process safety 
Conceptual HAZID Bowtie
FEED HAZID HAZOP Bowtie
Detailed 
Engineering HAZID HAZOP Bowtie
Operation JSA
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indicators data from more than 30 volunteering companies. The current report provides 
an analysis to process safety events that are tier 1 and tier 2, which are principally 
lagging indicators. Benchmarking results are also anonymously reported and a specific 
company can compare themselves with peers in the industry. Tier 3 and 4 process safety 
indicators, which are considered as leading indicators, are planned to be included in the 
future update of the report (IOGP, 2015). Thus far, the information collected serves as 
key performance indicators, representing the performance level of process safety, and 
help companies to keep track of their barriers’ effectiveness. These indicator data are 
generally excluded from a probability estimation of possible hazardous scenarios when a 
quantitative risk analysis is performed. Thus, the calculated risk value may not reflect a 
true state of an operation. 
Bayesian theorem is a statistical process. It is used to calculate conditional 
probability given information at hand. The theory was independently discovered by 
Reverend Thomas Bayes in 1763 and Pierre-Simon Laplace in 1812 (Stone, 2013). The 
simple form of Bayes theorem is shown in Equation 1, where: B is an event of interest; 
and A is newly observed information. P(A) and P(B) are the probability of event A and 
event B occurring, respectively. P(A|B) is a probability of event A given event B 
occurred; whereas P(B|A) is the probability of event B given event A is observed. The 
formula can be rewritten in probability terms as shown in Equation 2. 
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Equation 1: Bayes Theorem ! "|$ = ! $|" ! "! $  
 
Equation 2: Bayes Theorem in Probability Terms (Stone, 2013) !&'()*+&*	-*&./.+0+(1 = 	 0+2)0+ℎ&&4	×	-*+&*	-*&./.+0+(16/*7+8/0	0+2)0+ℎ&&4  
 
The Bayesian methodology provides a means to incorporate soft evidences or 
new observations to improve the existing knowledge of an event of interest. Updated 
equipment conditions, safety critical elements state, or changes in organizational factor 
can be used as inputs to provide a better estimation of process safety event probability. 
The benefit of this method is not only a possible dynamic representation of the 
operational risk of a facility, but also an ability to identify critical contributing causes 
that lead to a catastrophic incident. Once the causes are identified, corrective measures 
can be made to reduce the probability of such an event. 
Bayesian network (BN) is a graphical representation of stochastic variable nodes 
and their interrelated cause and effect relationships. It is considered as a subset of the 
directed acyclic graph (DAG) family. The directed arc or edge (shown as an arrow) 
originates from the parent node(s) and connected to the child node(s). However, as the 
arrow does not link back to the parent node(s), the relationship does not form a cycle (an 
effect cannot be its own cause). Each node signifies the probability of an event of 
interest occurring, such as dropped object, corrosion, or gas explosion. An arrow 
connecting any two nodes indicates a causal relationship, such as (a) between corrosion 
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and loss of primary containment, and (b) between failure of platform crane and dropped 
object. A network can be made for a small corrosion inhibitor pumping unit or even for 
an entire offshore central processing facility. An application of BN with process safety 
has shown a rapid interest in the past decade, jumping from three documents in 2005 to 
64 documents in 2015, as illustrated in Figure 4. It should be noted that the information 
was accessed on July 31st, 2016 and therefore might not reflect the total number of 
publications that might be published in the second half of the year. Many studies provide 
methodologies to transform traditional risk assessment into a BN to offer the ability to 
incorporate other factors from equipment and process conditions to human and 
organizational factors. The common objective of the conversion to BN is to enhance the 
methods’ capability to handle dynamic risks in an operational environment as well as to 
ensure the effectiveness of barriers in place with an ultimate goal of preventing future 
process safety incidents. The methodology and the current progress in the dynamic risk 
assessment and BN applications are discussed in Section 2.  
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Figure 4: The Number of Publications Given Search Terms “Bayesian Network” and 
“Process Safety” (Without Quote) in the Title, Abstract, or Keywords (Scopus, 2016) 
 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
In today’s oil and gas industry, HAZOP and Bow-tie are used as the standard 
procedures in hazard identification. Bayes theorem has been applied to those methods to 
enable risk updates using new information. Process safety indicators can be rationally 
exercised as inputs for a BN method. The current progress demonstrates indicators 
aggregation to Bow-tie-BN study. However, since the Bow-tie study is developed 
following other hazard identification studies such as HAZOP, the question is whether 
HAZOP-BN provides an adequate risk assessment or if Bow-tie-BN is a more preferred 
pathway.   Therefore, it is prudent to determine the procedure that can provide the best 
solution in predicting a probability of occurrence of process safety events in the future. 
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1.3. Research Objectives 
The primary goal of this research is to identify the best integrated procedure 
between HAZOP-BN and Bow-tie-BN to improve quantitative estimations of the 
process safety incident probability. In order to determine the best procedure, objectives 
of this research are to: - 
• Develop a dynamic Bayesian network based on HAZOP and Bow-tie 
analysis; 
• Devise a method for incorporating multiple process safety leading and 
lagging indicators as a precursor to a process safety event; 
• Propose a new approach to assess risks for an offshore production 
facility. 
 
1.4. Previous Research at MKOPSC 
Dynamic risk assessment is a relatively new field of study; several researches 
were developed at the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center (MKOPSC). In 2007, 
Geun-Woong Yun pioneered Bayesian application for Layer of Protection Analysis 
(LOPA) using Microsoft Excel to compute the failure data of a LNG importation 
terminal. A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study was conducted to identify possible 
incident scenarios followed by a LOPA study to quantify the risk level of a facility. 
Next, generic failure data obtained from the Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA) and the 
European Industry Reliability Data Bank (EIReDA) were updated with LNG plant 
specific data using Bayesian-LOPA methodology. One of the recommendations was to 
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incorporate fault tree and event tree analysis to achieve more reliable frequencies of 
initiating events (Yun, 2007). 
Xiaole Yang introduced simulation-based dynamic operational risk assessment 
(DORA) that can be applied to both the design and operational phase of a facility. 
During the design period, DORA aids the design of a safety system to achieve as low as 
reasonably practicable risk level. In the operational phase, cost effective decision making 
is realized through an optimization of maintenance and inspection intervals. Bayesian 
updating was applied for reliability information of a system using plant specific or test 
data. Matlab software was selected for conducting a case study for level control in 
oil/gas separator. It was recommended that Bayesian application to a complex system is 
needed while a more sophisticated software may be required (Yang, 2010). 
Shubharthi Barua applied BN to FTA for a holdup tank level control failure 
problem and observed the effect of different maintenance intervals on a probability of 
failure for components in the system. Prior probabilities from OREDA and CCPS were 
updated with the maintenance data. However, a discrete model was performed using 
point values instead of distributions. It is therefore recommended that continuous BN 
should be considered in the future (Barua, 2012). 
 
  14 
1.5. Organization of this Thesis 
This thesis is organized into five sections as follows: - 
Section 1 provides background information that addresses the importance of 
fossil fuels in the global energy market. Risk management for the oil and gas industry is 
briefly discussed followed by the problem statement and research objectives. 
Section 2 explores various literatures on hazard identification and risk 
assessment techniques, Bayesian network and its application to traditional risk 
assessment, and possible uses of process safety indicators information. 
Section 3 describes detailed processes in the development of HAZOP-BN and 
Bow-tie-BN. List of process safety indicators collected by an energy company and the 
indicators aggregation method, followed by the prior probability definition procedure for 
the BN diagrams are explained. BN calculations for the completed model based on 
information provided by the indicators are included. 
Section 4 presents the results obtained from both HAZOP-BN and Bow-tie-BN 
model. Analysis of the discrepancies between the results are elaborated. 
Lastly, Section 5 provides conclusions and recommendations for future works. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Managing hazards and risks in oil and gas operations essentially comprised two 
key steps: 1) hazard identification; and 2) risk assessment and management (F. Khan, 
Rathnayaka, & Ahmed, 2015). The first step is generally qualitative with the goal of 
recognizing hazards that could develop into unsafe scenarios. The second step is to 
manage that hazardous scenario by assessing an associated risk level, which includes 
evaluating a magnitude of an event and estimating the probability that the event will 
occur. Following risk assessment, risk management can be performed by reducing the 
magnitude of a consequence or decreasing a probability of occurrence. A company’s risk 
management framework encompasses multiple layers of hazard identification methods, 
risk assessment, and process safety management programs. Continuous efforts have been 
made to prevent and mitigate process safety incidents. However, the process safety 
incident statistics does not reflect a diminishing trend (F. Khan et al., 2015; H. Pasman, 
2015a). In response to mitigate future incidents, a process safety indicator system was 
established as a precursor to major incidents similar to the practice in an occupational 
safety area (IOGP, 2011a). The modern process safety research is moving toward 
methods that can quantitatively incorporate dynamic behaviors of the operations, handle 
data scarcity, reduce uncertainties, and consider human and organizational aspects. This 
section provides the introduction to various hazard identification techniques, current 
progress in the Bayesian network application that enhances risk assessment and 
management capabilities and dynamically update the prior belief based on additional 
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observations (H. Pasman, 2015b), and the adoption of process safety indicator data into a 
risk assessment method. 
 
2.1. Hazard Identification Techniques 
Many techniques are developed for identifying hazards and risk assessment. The 
simplest method is a process hazard checklist (Crowl & Louvar, 2011; F. I. Khan & 
Abbasi, 1998). Checklist questions are prepared in advance based on operation and 
maintenance history, lessons learned from previous incidents, regulatory or industrial 
standards requirements, or best practices in the industry (Barua, 2012). Once developed, 
an operator or a reviewer uses the list to address potential problem areas. The 
effectiveness of the method depends on the competency of the operator or reviewer 
implementing the checklist and the comprehensiveness of the checklist questions. The 
checklist may consist of hundreds or thousands of questions to cover the whole 
operations of the facility. Nonetheless, it is possible that some hazard scenarios might go 
unnoticed, thus limiting the applicability of the method to only during the preliminary 
stage of the project development. Hence, it is not recommended to be used as a 
replacement for a more complete hazard identification techniques (Crowl & Louvar, 
2011; Yang, 2010). 
A What-If analysis is a brainstorming session that identifies potential hazardous 
scenarios by asking questions with “what if …”. The questions are open-ended without 
specific rules. The method is relatively simple and does not require any specialized 
technique or a computational tool. The results from the study are qualitative and the 
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method is suitable for only relatively simple scenarios. In addition, the quality of the 
study greatly relies on the team’s experiences (Crowl & Louvar, 2011; F. I. Khan & 
Abbasi, 1998). 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed in 1960s by Bell Laboratories and has 
been widely adopted by the nuclear industry prior to the chemical process industry 
(Crowl & Louvar, 2011; F. I. Khan & Abbasi, 1998). The method starts with a defined 
incident or a top event. It uses deductive reasoning to determine intermediate events and 
basic events failures that can cause an incident or top event. AND-gate and OR-gate 
connect basic events or intermediate events that are later formed into a tree. A cause-
effect concept is utilized in the FTA, enabling logical mapping of the events and 
understanding of failure mechanism (Rathnayaka, Khan, & Amyotte, 2011). An example 
fault tree is shown in Figure 5. However, the method has limited ability to accommodate 
a dynamically changing environment and common cause failures of the events (Barua, 
2012). 
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Figure 5: Example Fault Tree for Pressure Tank Rupture Event (Mannan, 2012) 
  19 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) was conceived by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in 1975 (Barua, 2012). The method is used to explore potential 
consequences that may arise from an initial incident or event using an inductive 
reasoning. Potential consequences are branched out of the starting event, forming a tree-
like diagram, where each branch represents a specific outcome. Safety systems or 
barriers are generally listed above the event tree to provide multiple pathways that lead 
to multiple consequences. If the description of the safety system or barrier is true, the 
scenario follows the top pathway before continuing to the next safety system or barrier. 
The probability of an outcome scenario can be calculated using a probability of an 
initiating event and a probability of success/failure of each safety system or barrier 
(Crowl & Louvar, 2011; Mannan, 2012). An example event tree is shown in Figure 6. 
Similar to the FTA, limitation exists in applying ETA methods for modeling a dynamic 
environment (Bucci et al., 2008). 
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Figure 6: Example Event Tree for Operator Response to Nuclear Reactor Transient  
(Mannan, 2012) 
 
 
Bow-tie method was introduced in 1979 at an Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) 
training course and was later used by Shell Company in 1990s (H. Pasman, 2015a). A 
simple Bow-tie is given in Figure 7. It is a merge between the fault tree and the event 
tree via an event, generally called a “top event” or “critical event”. The left side of the 
Bow-tie is the fault tree, which illustrates various causes, called “threats”, that are 
leading to the top event. The event tree is shown on the right hand side demonstrating 
possible consequences propagated from the top event. In addition, the Bow-tie diagram 
also shows safety barriers that can be implemented to avoid the top event from occurring 
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or to alleviate the magnitude of the consequences. Those barriers are referred to as 
“preventive barriers” and “mitigation barriers”, respectively. The preventive and 
mitigation barriers are also known as a Safety Critical Element (SCE) or a safety critical 
system, which, upon failure, may lead to the catastrophic incidents. The Bow-tie 
diagrams are made during a safety case development to manage high-risk scenarios and 
to prevent them from happening. One of the major advantages of Bow-tie is its graphical 
representation of pathways of unsafe scenarios that illustrates relationships between 
threats, preventive barriers, top event, hazard, mitigation barriers, and consequences 
(Mannan, 2012). Therefore, it is a preferred method in hazard and risk communications 
to non-technical personnel. In addition to its visualization ability, probability values can 
be assigned to each event and barrier, enabling a quantitative assessment. The method 
has been well proven in the process safety analysis as well as the accident risk analysis. 
However, it still suffered the same limitation as FTA and ETA in dynamic risk 
assessment (Khakzad, Khan, & Amyotte, 2012). 
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Another well-established and accepted method is a Hazard and Operability 
(HAZOP) study, which was also developed by the ICI in 1974 (F. I. Khan & Abbasi, 
1998). The study was conducted by a multi-disciplinary team from design engineers to 
operators to review and identify possible deviations from a defined design intent. 
HAZOP documentations include, but are not limited to, Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs), 
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), Heat and Material Balances (H&MBs), 
standard operating procedures, and equipment specifications (Crowl & Louvar, 2011). 
Guidewords are applied to process parameters to form possible deviations. 
Brainstorming is performed for each applicable deviation to examine the documents and 
identify possible causes and describe potential consequences. Safeguards are sought for 
Threat 1 
Threat 3 
Threat 2 Top Event 
Consequence 1 
Consequence 2 
Preventive barriers 
Mitigation barriers 
Hazard 
Figure 7: Simple Representation of a Bow-tie Diagram 
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each hazardous scenario while a recommendation is made where insufficient safeguards 
are observed. Due to its systematic and thoroughness of the process in identifying 
hazardous operations, it is the most successful method in process hazard assessment (F. 
Khan et al., 2015; H. Pasman, 2015a; H. J. Pasman, Knegtering, & Rogers, 2013). 
Nonetheless, it suffered from a limitation to consider spatial features, and extensive time 
and manpower commitment to execute the method (Barua, 2012; F. I. Khan & Abbasi, 
1998). 
 
2.2. Bayesian Network Application to HAZOP and Bow-tie Studies 
Bayesian method is widely used in artificial intelligence for a deep learning and a 
machine learning application (F. Khan et al., 2015). It is also applied in the medical, 
psychology, and reliability fields. Recently, Bayesian method has been used in the 
search for the flight MH370 incident that occurred in 2014 (Davey, Gordon, Holland, 
Rutten, & Williams, 2016). In the past decade, this method has gained drastic attentions 
in process safety discipline and was mentioned in 491 documents (Scopus, 2016). Weber 
et al. (2012) studied 200 articles related to Bayesian network (BN) application to 
dependability, risk analysis, and maintenance subject. They found that 26% fall under 
the risk analysis category (Weber, Medina-Oliva, Simon, & Iung, 2012). Bayes’ rule or 
Bayes’ theorem is a rigorous method that takes into account previous experiences or 
additional information to estimate the probability of an event. Cause and effect 
relationships are crucial in developing a BN. Events of interest are depicted by a node in 
BN; whereas directed arc or edge (shown as an arrow) originates from one node (parent 
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node, cause node) to another node (child node, effect node). BNs are direct acyclic 
graphs (DAGs) because an effect cannot be its own cause but can cause other effects (H. 
Pasman, 2015b). 
For continuous variables, the form of Bayes’ theorem is shown in Equation 3, 
where 9 :|(  is the posterior probability density function for a continuous random 
variable : given continuous variable t. 0 (|:  is the likelihood function based on sample 
data t, and ℎ :  is the prior probability density function for the variable :. 
 
Equation 3: Bayes Theorem for Continuous Variables 9 :|( = 	 0 (|: ℎ :0 (|: ℎ : 4:;<;  
 
The traditional risk assessment methods described in Section 2.1 are effective in 
hazard identification and risk assessment. However, not all methods are suitable for BN 
application. The checklist and what-if analysis are fairly simple and are not applicable 
for a complex and dynamic risk assessment. Therefore, they will not be considered 
further in this study. The FTA and ETA provide a logical mapping of cause and effect 
relationships in hazardous scenarios and are rational options for BN development. Bow-
tie analysis encompasses both FTA and ETA in its study and provides a better overview 
of the scenarios. Hence, it is prudent to select Bow-tie as a preferred method for BN 
application. Khakzad et al. (2012) applied Bayes’ theorem to update the fault tree and 
event tree in the Bow-tie diagram with new observations or information, enabling 
dynamic risk analysis for the facility (Khakzad et al., 2012). Later, in 2013, they 
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performed Bayesian network analysis using probability updating and probability 
adapting method to Bowtie-BN (see Figure 8). The first method is used to calculate the 
posterior probability when a certain event is observed, i.e. P(xi|Q). In the latter method, 
posterior probability is calculated when a certain event has occurred “n” times, i.e. 
P(xi|Q=n). It was shown that the probability adapting method is preferable to 
dynamically assess risks because the prior probability is updated using new observations 
(Khakzad, Khan, & Amyotte, 2013). Application of BN with Bow-tie analysis is also 
performed for offshore drilling operation by using accident precursors in risk updating 
(Abimbola, Khan, & Khakzad, 2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Bow-tie (left) and BN (right) model for Gasoline Release Scenario, 
Reproduced from (Khakzad et al., 2013) 
 
 
HAZOP study is one of the industry-standard methods for risk assessment due to 
its comprehensiveness, as mentioned previously. However, the results of the analysis are 
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not presented in a form of DAG, instead, they are presented in a form of table 
summarizing parameters, guidewords, causes, consequences, safeguards, and 
recommendations (see Table 1). Therefore, additional steps are required to extract 
hazardous scenarios from a specific node in order to construct a BN. A node in HAZOP 
study represents a subsystem under consideration and normally starts from a shutdown 
valve or a piping specification break upstream of a system or equipment to another 
shutdown valve or another piping specification break downstream of that system or 
equipment. Wang et al. (2015) demonstrated an early warning capability of the HAZOP-
based BN. A case study for a tank system is given and shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 
(Wang, Khan, & Ahmed, 2015). Hu et al. (2010) developed an integrated method based 
on the HAZOP study and the dynamic BN. The process of converting HAZOP into BN 
is shown in Figure 11. Observable variables from the supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) are used to update a condition of a plant and provide a pre-
warning alarm for proactive maintenance. The method can also prioritize possible causes 
of an unsafe scenario, assisting field engineers to find the most likely explanation. 
Consequently, catastrophic incidents can be avoided as soon as possible (Hu, Zhang, 
Ma, & Liang, 2010). 
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Figure 9: Schematic of a Tank System, Reproduced from (Wang et al., 2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Bayesian Network Model for a Tank System Shown in Figure 9, Reproduced 
from (Wang et al., 2015) 
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Table 1: Typical HAZOP Result Table 
Parameters Guidewords Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations 
      
      
      
 
 
 
Figure 11: Dynamic BN Construction Mechanism, Reproduced from (Hu et al., 2010) 
 
 
2.3. Process Safety Indicators 
Process safety indicators (PSIs) are established to reinforce the risk control in 
process facilities. The indicators reflect performance levels of risk barriers in the process 
with certain probability. Taking advantage of the network
structure, ‘‘combinational explosion” in conventional assess-
ment methods can be avoid, because the root cause can be
easily located through network structure with largest occur-
rence probability, and a hazard propagation pathway (if it is
possible) can be provided by DBN inference mechanism,
instead of giving large numbers of hazard outcomes.
(3) Determination of DBN parameters, i.e., the definition of all
the conditional probability tables (CPTs). CPTs can be deter-
mined by learning the parameters from the database, or
depending on an expert’s judgment.
! Parameter learning based on historical data: if there is
sufficient samples in database for every parameter in
DBN, sample statistic approach (Xiao et al., 2007) can
be used for parameter learning; if there is partially obser-
vable or insufficient data, EM or gradient algorithm (Mur-
phy, 2002; Xiao et al., 2007) can be used for learning.
! Parameter learning based on expert experience: when
the data is insufficient, another way to determine param-
eters (conditional probabilities) is according to expert
experience first, then updating them by collecting condi-
tion monitoring data and maintenance records in the
future periodically. As for conditional probabilities
between static variables, the CPT can usually be deter-
mined by determinative functional equations as physical
rules, such as the function of pressure, volume and
temperature.
In this way, the DBN model integrating the results of both HAZ-
OP analysis and degradation process modeling describes the evolu-
tion of the states of some systems (subsystems, components) in
terms of their joint probability distribution. At each instance in
time t the states of the system depend only on the states at the pre-
vious (t"1) and possibly current time instance. Furthermore, the
DBN model is a probability distribution function on the sequence
of T hidden-state variables X ¼ fx0; . . . ; xT"1g and the sequence of
T observables Y ¼ fy0; . . . ; yT"1g that has the following factorisa-
tion, which satisfies the requirements for DBNs that state xt depend
only on state xt"1:
PrðX;YÞ ¼
YT"1
t¼1
Prðxtjxt"1Þ &
YT"1
t¼0
PrðytjxtÞ & Prðx0Þ ð4Þ
In order to further specify a DBN, above parameters as CPT can be
classified as follows.
! State transition CPT Pr(xt+1|xt), which has already determined in
the phase 2, i.e. degradation process modeling, and can be mod-
ified or improved in DBN parameter learning process if it is
needed.
! Observation CPT Pr (yt|xt), which is the other key step in this
phase, and will be illustrated in detail as follows, and
! Initial state probability distribution Pr (x0).
Taking system in GTCS as an example, the DBN is then devel-
oped integrating the HAZOP and degradation models of the air sys-
tem, and the DBN structure is shown in Fig. 6, according to which
the CPTs of all the observations are shown in Tables 10–14 deter-
mined by historical databases and maintenance records.
Specifically, taking two nodes (D1_1"S1_1) (i.e. Air filter degrada-
tion as hidden-state variable and dynamic node – differential
HAZOP Analysis
Variables Deviations Interrelationship
Hazard reasons & 
consequences
System parameters
(Obtained from sensors)
State 
spaces Interdependency
Failure 
modes
Exogenous 
factors
Hidden-state 
variables
(Dynamic nodes)
Observable 
variables
(Static nodes)
State of DBN nodes
(Hidden state space;
Observable state space)
Network 
structure
DBN 
Degradation 
Process Model
Hidden-state 
variables
(Static nodes)
Fig. 5. Mechanism of DBN construction in the integrated method.
E1_1 D1_1(k-1) D1_2(k-1)
D1_1(k) D1_2(k)
S1_1 S1_2 S1_3
S1_4
S1_5
Fig. 6. Dynamic network structure of air system.
J. Hu et al. / Safety Science 48 (2010) 580–597 587
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safety area, which deals with a prevention and control of loss of containment of 
hazardous materials or energy. Many organizations have issued guidelines or standards 
related to PSIs, such as the American Petroleum Institute (API) standard on “Process 
Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries (RP 754)” 
(API, 2016), the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)’s “Guideline for Process 
Safety Metrics” (CCPS, 2010), and the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers 
(IOGP)’s report on “Process Safety – Recommended Practice on Key Performance 
Indicators” (IOGP, 2011a). The CCPS guideline provides an extensive list of 350 
indicators to embrace its 20 process safety management system elements. In addition, 
the Master thesis done by Hassan presents 279 asset integrity indicators for three pillars 
of asset integrity, which are mechanical integrity, operational integrity, and personnel 
integrity (M. J. Hassan, 2011). Mendeloff et al. (2013) analyzed data collecting from the 
industry based on the first edition of API RP 754. They found that major firms have 
already collected data beyond standard’s requirements. The study concluded that PSIs 
might help increasing an awareness in process safety comparing with the well-
established-and-regulated occupational safety indicators (Mendeloff, Han, Fleishman-
Mayer, & Vesely, 2013). 
Following API RP 754 and IOGP 456, a 4-tier approach is devised for PSIs to 
collect not only major incidents, which are relatively rare, but also the more frequent and 
lower consequence events. A tier 1 represents the most lagging indicators group while 
the tier 4 is the most leading group. Definitions of each tier are provided in API 
document (API, 2016) and are reproduced in below for clear understanding. 
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“A Tier 1 Process Safety Event (T-1 PSE) is a loss of primary containment 
(LOPC) with the greatest consequence. A T-1 PSE is an unplanned or uncontrolled 
release of any material, including non-toxic and nonflammable materials (e.g. steam, hot 
water, nitrogen, compressed carbon dioxide or compressed air), from a process that 
results in one or more of the consequences listed below; 
• An employee, contractor or subcontractor “days away from work” injury 
and/or fatality. 
• A hospital admission and/or fatality of a third-party. 
• An officially declared community evacuation or community shelter-in-
place including precautionary community evacuation or community 
shelter-in-place. 
• A fire or explosion damage greater than or equal to $100,000 of direct 
cost. 
• An engineered pressure relief (e.g. PRD, SIS, or manually initiated 
emergency depressure) discharge, of a quantity greater than or equal to 
the threshold quantities in any one-hour period, to atmosphere whether 
directly or via a downstream destructive device that results in one or 
more of the following four consequences: 
o rainout; 
o discharge to a potentially unsafe location; 
o an on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation, excluding 
precautionary on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation; 
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o public protective measures (e.g. road closure) including 
precautionary public protective measures. 
• An upset emission from a permitted or regulated source, of a quantity 
greater than or equal to the threshold quantities in any one-hour period, 
that results in one or more of the following four consequences: 
o rainout; 
o discharge to a potentially unsafe location; 
o an on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation, excluding 
precautionary on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation; 
o public protective measures (e.g. road closure) including 
precautionary public protective measures. 
• A release of material greater than or equal to the threshold quantities in 
any one-hour period. 
A Tier 2 Process Safety Event (T-2 PSE) is a LOPC with lesser consequence. A 
T-2 PSE is an unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material, including non-toxic 
and non-flammable materials (e.g. steam, hot water, nitrogen, compressed carbon 
dioxide, or compressed air), from a process that results in one or more of the 
consequences listed below and is not reported as a Tier 1 PSE. 
• An employee, contractor or subcontractor recordable injury. 
• A fire or explosion damage greater than or equal to $2500 of direct cost. 
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NOTE: Some companies rather than performing a detailed estimate use a 
simple rule-of-thumb to determine if the direct cost exceeded $2500: If 
the damage requires repair, then the direct cost is often at least $2500. 
• An engineered pressure relief (PRD, SIS, or manually initiated 
emergency depressure) device discharge, of a quantity greater than or 
equal to the threshold quantities in any one-hour period, to atmosphere 
whether directly or via a downstream destructive device that results in 
one or more of the following four consequences: 
o rainout; 
o discharge to a potentially unsafe location; 
o an on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation excluding 
precautionary on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation; 
o public protective measures (e.g. road closure); 
o including precautionary public protective measures. 
• An upset emission from a permitted or regulated source, of a quantity 
greater than or equal to the threshold quantities in any one-hour period, 
that results in one or more of the following four consequences: 
o rainout; 
o discharge to a potentially unsafe location; 
o an on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation, excluding 
precautionary on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation; 
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o public protective measures (e.g. road closure) including 
precautionary public protective measures. 
• A release of material greater than or equal to the threshold quantities in 
any one-hour period. 
A Tier 3 PSE typically represents a challenge to the barrier system that 
progressed along the path to harm, but is stopped short of a Tier 1 or Tier 2 PSE 
consequence. Indicators at this level provide an additional opportunity to identify and 
correct weaknesses within the barrier system. 
Tier 4 indicators typically represent performance of individual components of the 
barrier system and are comprised of operating discipline and management system 
performance. Indicators at this level provide an opportunity to identify and correct 
isolated system weaknesses. Tier 4 indicators are indicative of process safety system 
weaknesses that may contribute to future Tier 1 or Tier 2 PSEs. In that sense, Tier 4 
indicators may identify opportunities for both learning and systems improvement. Tier 4 
indicators are too facility-specific for benchmarking or developing industry applicable 
criteria. They are intended for internal company use and for local (facility) reporting.” 
 
In this study, 11 PSIs are considered based on available data obtained from an 
energy company. Tier 1 and tier 2 PSIs are lagging indicators, which resulted in a 
considerable impact, and tier 3 and tier 4 PSIs are leading indicators, which comprised 
near misses, unsafe conditions, or failures of safety barriers. These leading indicators 
provide evidence to the barriers’ health and the effectiveness of major incident 
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prevention of a facility or an organization. Detailed definitions of the 11 PSIs are given 
in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Process Safety Indicators Definition 
Indicator Definition 
Number of tier 1 
LOPC 
Number of LOPC events that conformed to T-1 PSE definition 
provided in API RP 754.  
Number of tier 2 
LOPC 
Number of LOPC events that conformed to T-2 PSE definition 
provided in API RP 754. 
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Table 2 Continued 
Indicator Definition 
Number of tier 3 
LOPC 
Number of LOPC events that results in one or more of the 
consequences listed below: 
• fire or explosion; 
• action to prevent or limit the consequence of a potential fire 
or explosion; 
• has a potential to cause fatality or major injury 
• a continuous release of gas or 2 phases flow at a rate greater 
than 1 kg/hour; 
• a discrete release of gas or 2 phases flow with a total mass 
greater than 0.1 kg; 
• a continuous release of liquid at a rate greater than 5 kg/day; 
• a discrete release of liquid with a total mass greater than 5 
kg. 
Number of failure 
on test or demand 
of SCE 
Any failure of SCE related to process safety during test or in-situ 
demand. 
Percentage of SCE 
backlog 
Percentage of SCE that fall behind maintenance schedule. 
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Table 2 Continued 
Indicator Definition 
Number of 
unplanned process 
shutdown 
Number of unplanned shutdowns of process units, initiated either 
manually or automatically. 
Number of 
emergency 
blowdown 
Number of emergency blowdowns of process units, initiated either 
manually or automatically. 
Number of tier 4 
LOPC 
Number of LOPC events that are below defined criteria for tier 3 
LOPC. 
Percentage of 
contractor 
companies with 
approved safety 
plan 
Number of contracts with approved safety plan compared to total 
number of contracts in execution on site. 
Ratio of 
planned/unplanned 
maintenance 
Ratio of hours spent on planned/unplanned maintenance activities. 
Number of 
deviation on SCE 
in place 
Number of deviations (derogations) presented at the time of 
reporting. 
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2.4. Process Safety Indicators and Bayesian Network 
Process safety indicators are implemented as a part of a company’s process 
safety management system, providing feedbacks to continuously improve system 
performance. One of the objectives is to reduce the LOPC number to zero, similar to the 
occupational safety’s goal of zero fatality or zero loss time injury (LTI). However, a 
chance of occurrence of a process safety event is much lower than that of the 
occupational safety, which makes the trend examination for a process safety event 
misleading or inconclusive. Indicators themselves may also demonstrate erratic or 
random trend due to many possible contributing factors involved (H. Pasman & Rogers, 
2014). The number of barriers presented in an oil and gas operating facility can easily 
reach several hundreds or thousands, which can result in the same amount of indicators 
set up to measure their performances. This is beyond the capability of human to 
straightforwardly comprehend their implication or to grasp the overview of the situation. 
Therefore, the indicators aggregation method was proposed to rationally combined 
multiple indicators into few and apprehensible elements. Hassan (2011) presented an 
analytical hierarchy process that grouped 279 specific leading and lagging indicators into 
three key element indicators as shown in Figure 12 (M. J. Hassan, 2011). However, the 
work did not use the indicators’ information to update the risk assessment. Pasman & 
Rogers (2014) adopted and applied Hassan’s framework to the Bow-tie analysis for an 
offshore process facility. Figure 13 demonstrates the causal relationships between the 
indicators and various elements in the BN model. Therefore, changes in the key element 
indicators’ value can impact a probability of occurrence of a hazardous event, which 
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eventually influence a cost of incident if monetary amounts are assigned to each 
consequence outcome (H. Pasman & Rogers, 2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Hierarchical Process for Indicators Aggregation as Defined by Hassan (2010), 
Reproduced from (H. Pasman & Rogers, 2014) 
 
  39 
 
Figure 13: Continuous Bayesian Network with Indicators Integration, Reproduced from (H. Pasman & Rogers, 2014) 
 
network, but in case of the continuous distribution mode it can be
fully included in the net. This is because the calculation can handle
both the probability distributions and also the arithmetic of the
cost determination, making the computation more convenient.
The effect calculations have been done separately, applying for
the BLEVE the data speciﬁed in the latest Dutch RIVM Manual
recommended for QRA (RIVM, 2009, p. 40). Thereby 70% of the
mass of 5000 kg hydrocarbon is expected to BLEVE, which yields a
w60 m radius of 50% lethality damage circle (radiant heat 35 kW/
m2; exposure time 9 s). Only part of the people on board will be
exposed directly and going in detail results in many questions.
However, in view of ensuing ﬁres, which certainly will be ignited as
domino effects, this circle is being maintained. For the vapor cloud
explosion, the Multi-Energy method was applied as described in
the Yellow Book (2005). Assuming that 50% of the released hy-
drocarbon participates in the deﬂagration, it will result in a 50%
lethality radius of 105 m at 0.3 bar overpressure.2 Another aspect is
that Khan et al. (2002) did not specify the rig’s dimensions, but for
an estimate of damage assumptions a size must be assumed. So, a
fair sized rig is imagined of 80 ! 100 m, costing 800 million USD,
with 80 people on board. In view of the limited size of the platform
(area 8000 m2) compared to the effect circles of BLEVE (11,310 m2)
and VCE (34,500 m2), the 50% lethality perimeter will be mostly
outside the platform. Therefore, only half the area of the platform is
assumed to be hit severely within the 50% lethality bound. Ignition
probabilities are also chosen to be slightly different. The BLEVE is
supposed to ignite immediately (due to the heat generated in the
metal by the rupture), while the probability of delayed ignition of
the vapor cloud by, e.g., a hot surface or a spark of remote electric
equipment outside the electrically classiﬁed area, is assumed as 0.2.
As has been shown in Pasman and Rogers (2012), the number of
fatalities by multiplying the homogeneous population density with
the area of the 50% lethality contour yields a sufﬁcient approxi-
mation of the total number of people perished. Based on a density
of 1 person per 100 m2, in case of the vapor cloud explosion it
means a maximum loss of life of 40 people. For the monetary value
of life, 7 million US$ is taken as recommended by Kip Viscusi
(2005). It is further supposed that the material damage amounts
to US$ 5000 per m2 over the area of 50% lethality (hence here for
BLEVE and VCE, half the rig’s surface area). This material damage
ﬁgure is not really substantiated, but an estimate was made, given
the cost to build a rig and assuming that half the cost is on the high
side. Damage by follow-on phenomena is not considered, but these
expected events may lead to a total loss of the rig.
The resulting Bayesian network based on the bow-tie, but
extended with respect to the event tree part and cost, is shown in
Fig. 4. In addition for demonstration of the possibilities, included
are the top three integrity indicators affecting those parts of the
installation of which it can be assumed that their functioning is
highly dependent on the quality of operation and maintenance. or
on appropriate design (component no. 12). In the end, personnel
integrity is considered to be dominating, and it is therefore
assumed also to determine operation and maintenance integrity,
although personnel integrity’s direct effect on the functioning of
the installation will be sensed less. The effect is constituted such
that personnel integrity is given a certain constant value, while for
simplicity maintenance and operational integrity are assumed here
to have the same value. In case real inputs would be obtained, these
constant values can easily be replaced by probability distributions
that can differ from each other and whereby the maintenance and
operational integrity are conditionally independent of personnel
Fig. 4. Continuous Bayesian network based on the bow-tie modeled by Khan et al. (2002). Numbered nodes correspond with the component numbers in the Fig. 3 table; OR-and
AND-gates are indicated. The event tree part (right) has been expanded with the additional possibility of a vapor/aerosol cloud explosion with a damage cost calculation. The top
level indicators (left) have been related to the failure rate of some of the components. The corresponding discrete net looks much the same apart from a simpler event tree.
2 Actually RIVM (2009, p. 40) states 0.3 bar as 100% lethal indoors. Due to sec-
ondary and tertiary injuries, this ﬁgure is used also for lethality outdoors. UK HSE
supports a ﬁgure of 0.3 bar for 50% lethality indoors (HSE, 2007).
H. Pasman, W. Rogers / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 30 (2014) 197e206202
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The research methodology is divided into 4 main parts; BN development, prior 
probability definition, process safety indicators integration, and posterior probability 
calculation. The overall process is summarized as shown in Figure 14. The BN 
development based on information from HAZOP or Bow-tie study is explained in 
Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Section 3.3 provides the PSI integration method. 
Section 3.4 elaborates the method used in defining prior probabilities for event nodes as 
well as PSI nodes. Lastly, BN algorithm for calculation of posterior probability is 
specified in Section 3.5.  
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Figure 14: Research Methodology 
 
 
3.1. HAZOP-BN Development 
The study begins with a completed HAZOP report obtained from an energy 
company. The HAZOP study was conducted for an entire offshore production platform 
by a team of expert in an oil and gas industry. Thus, it is considered to be well-founded 
and rational to be directly adopted for this research. However, it is not feasible to 
consider the whole report because there were more than 25 nodes and over 400 pages of 
HAZOP results, which may consist of unconnected scenarios. Thus, the scope of this 
research is limited to the loss of primary containment (LOPC) of high pressure 
hydrocarbon gas from an export gas compressor scenario. 
Bow-tie / 
HAZOP 
data 
Prior probability definition 
PS indicator integration 
BN algorithm 
PSIs data BN development 
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The export gas compressor system consists of mainly the compressor units, 
which compress gas from around 750 psi to 1,900 psig, and sale gas metering, which 
measure a quantity of gas sale before exporting to onshore gas separation facilities. The 
construction of the BN starts with identification of the LOPC scenario from the study. 
Subsequence consequences, such as fire and explosion, causes, and safeguards, were 
collected and defined separately from the LOPC node. Each node is then connected to 
each other where causal relationships can be identified. In this step, most causal 
relationships between causes and consequences can be easily identified. However, a 
detailed fault tree analysis may be required to determine dependency between each 
safeguard, e.g. where two safeguards need to fail simultaneously for a cause to develop 
into a subsequent event. Then, safeguards were extracted from each entry of the HAZOP 
study and directly applied to each cause, but not to the LOPC event, since they moderate 
the probability of occurrence of the immediate or intermediate cause rather than the 
LOPC. 
There are two main types of BN; a discrete type, and a continuous type. The 
discrete type BN is suitable for discrete variables where finite set of states or conditions 
can be defined and their probability can be described by one value. For example: 1) 
compressor’s states are set as either in failure or working condition; or 2) ratios of a 
preventive/corrective maintenance are set as high, medium, or low. When two nodes are 
causally linked, a crisp probability value is assigned to each state of a parent node. For a 
child node, a conditional probability table (CPT) is created where conditional probability 
value is required. The size of the CPT grows exponentially with the number of 
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connecting parents and their states, and the number of state of the child node. For 
instance, a child node with two states, e.g. available or not available, that has three 
parent nodes, which also having two states, will have the CPT size of 23 x 2 = 16, where 
each box requires a probability value. If a child node has seven parent nodes instead of 
three, the CPT size becomes 27 x 2 = 256. This can be impractical if the parent node has 
several states or when multiple parent nodes are connected to a single child node. 
Continuous type BN software allows distribution functions as inputs, treats each node as 
continuous variable, and defines the probability value using a continuous distribution or 
equation. The evaluation is convoluting the parent distribution with the child one 
through, e.g. a Monte-Carlo solver or in another software, by so-called, dynamic 
discretization. Hence, it is preferred when large number of causal relationships linked to 
a single node is expected and where a system under consideration encompassed complex 
interrelationships. In addition, continuous distribution allows incorporation of 
uncertainties in probability values collected from day-to-day operations either from a 
different in machine or imperfect data collection process, thus more realistic results can 
be obtained. 
Partial HAZOP result of the export gas compressor node is presented in Table 3. 
Following the steps described earlier, continuous type BN can be constructed. A LOPC 
event is created as a starting point. From the HAZOP study, an overpressure scenario is 
found to be an immediate cause of the LOPC. This overpressure is further caused by 
high pressure upstream of the compressor system, which occurs due to compressor trips. 
Preventive maintenance (PM) helps avoiding compressor trips or failure. Two dissimilar 
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check valves downstream of the inlet shut-down valve (SDV) and the inlet SDV tight 
shut-off (TSO) are considered as the safeguarding barriers for the high pressure node. 
Fully rated compressor suction system, pressure indicator control alarm high (PICAH), 
compressor blowdown, and pressure safety valve for upstream system are counted as 
safeguard against overpressure. A directed arc originates from the cause node (parent 
node) and connects to the effect node (child node). The constructed BN from this 
HAZOP entry is shown in Figure 15. GeNIe software version 2.1 is used for the BN 
development and calculation. Blue-colored nodes represent events of interest, whereas 
pink-colored nodes represent safeguards or barriers. 
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Table 3: Partial HAZOP Result where LOPC of Hydrocarbon Gas Scenario is Identified 
in the Consequence Column 
Parameters 
Guide-
words 
Causes Consequences Safeguards 
Flow No Export Gas 
Compressor 
trips/fails 
Potential for 
back-flow of high 
pressure gas from 
Export Gas 
Suction Scrubber 
to Raffinate 
Header, causing 
high pressure and 
possible 
overpressure of 
the upstream 
system 
- PM program for 
Compressors in line with 
Vendor recommendations 
- Suction side of Compressor 
is fully rated for discharge 
conditions 
- Inlet SDV closes on 
Compressor trip/shutdown, 
valve is TSO 
- Two dissimilar check valves 
downstream of the inlet SDV 
- Export Gas Compressor 
system will blowdown in an 
event of trip/shutdown over 
a period of several minutes 
- PICAH on Raffinate Header, 
with relief to HP Flare 
- PSV for Raffinate Gas 
Header upstream of the 
Compressor system 
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Figure 15: HAZOP-BN Model Constructed using Information Extracted from a Single 
HAZOP Entry Shown in Table 3 
 
 
Following the same steps, all entries from the export gas compressor HAZOP 
node were analyzed. Figure 16 to Figure 20 demonstrate different causes of the LOPC 
event. It should be noted that the LOPC HC gas node is duplicated in all of the figures to 
allow an ease of understanding. Figure 21 shows the consequence of the LOPC event. 
The overview of the HAZOP-BN model for the LOPC event is shown in Figure 22. 
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Figure 16: HAZOP-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event Caused by Overpressure 
 
 
 
Figure 17: HAZOP-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event Caused by Corrosion 
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Figure 18: HAZOP-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event Caused by Third Party 
(Ship) Impact 
 
 
 
Figure 19: HAZOP-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event Caused by High 
Temperature 
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Figure 20: HAZOP-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event Caused by Low Temperature 
Embrittlement 
 
 
 
Figure 21: HAZOP-BN Model Illustrating the Consequence Developed from the LOPC 
Event 
 
LOPC HC Gas
Operator Training
Low Temperature
Embrittlement
High Pressure Drop
Across Device
Material Selection
LOPC HC Gas Fire/Explosion
Control of
Ignition Sources
Passive Fire
Protection
Emergency
Response Plan
  50 
 
Figure 22: Overview of the HAZOP-BN Model for the LOPC Event 
Export Gas
Compressor
Trips
High Pressure
Upstream
High Pressure
Downstream
LOPC HC Gas
Overpressure
Preventive
Maintenance
Fully Rated
Compressor
Suction System
Two Dissimilar
Check Valves
Inlet SDV is TSO
Pressure Indicator
Alarm High
Blocked OutletOperator Training
High Reliability
Instrument Air
PSV for
Upstream
System
Corrosion
Third Party Impact
Pressure
Switch to
Initiate ESD
Routine
Corrosion
Monitoring
Sacrificial Anodes
ROV Monitoring
Intelligent
Pigging
Riser Guards
Vessel Permit for
Exclusion Zone
Fire/Explosion
Control of
Ignition Sources
Passive Fire
Protection
Emergency
Response Plan
Compressor
BlowdownGas Blowby Due
to Low Level of
Separator
Level Alarm Low
Level Switch to
Initiate ESD
Vessel Designed
for Blowby CaseRoutine
Operator
Monitoring
High Temperature
Discharge
Cooler Fans
Failure
Operator
Response to
Cooler Failure
Alarm
Temperature
Switch to
Initiate ESD
Air Recirculation
Hot Exhaust
Gas from
Turbines
Low Temperature
Embrittlement
High Pressure Drop
Across Device
Material Selection
  51 
3.2. Bow-tie-BN Development 
Bow-tie-BN development is slightly different from the HAZOP-BN. Even 
though a pictorial representation of a Bow-tie diagram and a Bayesian network are very 
similar, the development of Bow-tie-BN has its own challenges. Similar to the HAZOP 
study, the Bow-tie study was obtained from an energy company. It was conducted for an 
entire offshore production platform by a team of experts. Therefore, it is directly adopted 
for this research. However, only a LOPC of hydrocarbon gas Bow-tie was selected from 
the Bow-tie study out of 15 Bow-tie diagrams in total, which is considered to be 
adequate for this research. The Bow-tie diagram provides threats, top event, 
consequences, and safeguards for each threat and consequence. In addition, escalation 
factors are also developed in the original Bow-tie study. These escalation factors are 
failure scenarios that can impair a specific barrier, which can also be considered as a 
threat. Barriers to prevent the escalation factor from impairing the main barrier are 
shown on the line that connects between the escalation factor and the main barrier. The 
escalation factors are excluded from this study to simplify the model. The threats, top 
event, consequences, and safeguards nodes from the Bow-tie study can be directly 
adopted into the BN. The connection between each of the nodes is defined using cause-
and-effect analysis. Each threat is connected to the top event, i.e., LOPC, while the 
barriers are directly linked to the threats, not to the top event. A detailed fault tree 
analysis may be required where the failure of a single safeguard does not necessarily 
lead to a threat from developing into the top event. Continuous type BN is used because 
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of the same rationale given earlier in Section 3.1. The model is made with GeNIe 
software version 2.1. 
Figure 23 presents part of the Bow-tie diagram for the LOPC event. Internal 
corrosion is shown as a threat that leads to LOPC event. In between, four barriers, which 
are: routine non-destructive test (NDT) based on risk-based inspection (RBI) approach; 
corrosion inhibitor injection on remote wellhead platform (WHP); intelligent pigging; 
and corrosion monitoring, are identified. The BN model can be developed as shown in 
Figure 24, where blue-colored nodes represent events of interest; whereas pink-colored 
nodes represent safeguards or barriers. 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Partial Bow-tie Diagram of the LOPC Event Showing Internal Corrosion as a 
Threat 
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Figure 24: Bow-tie-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event with Internal Corrosion as a 
Threat 
 
 
The entire Bow-tie diagram was converted into BN following the same method 
as the internal corrosion threat shown above. Figure 25 to Figure 30 magnify each threat 
of the LOPC event, except for internal corrosion threat, which is already shown in 
Figure 24. Again, it should be noted that the LOPC HC gas node is duplicated in all of 
the figures to allow an ease of understanding. Figure 31 shows the consequence of the 
LOPC event. The overview of the Bow-tie-BN model for the LOPC event is shown in 
Figure 32. 
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Figure 25: Bow-tie-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event with External Corrosion as a 
Threat 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Bow-tie-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event with Overpressure as a 
Threat 
LOPC HC Gas
External Painting
Routine Visual
Inspection
Corrosion Under
Insulation Monitoring
External Corrosion
LOPC HC Gas
Pressure Relief
System
Pressure
Monitoring
System
Pressure Trip
System Overpressure
  55 
 
Figure 27: Bow-tie-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event with Leakage from Flanges 
and Valves as a Threat 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Bow-tie-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event with Mechanical Failure as a 
Threat 
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Figure 29: Bow-tie-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event with Internal Erosion as a 
Threat 
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Figure 30: Bow-tie-BN Model Illustrating the LOPC Event with Other Threats 
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Figure 31: Bow-tie-BN Model Illustrating the Consequences Developed from the LOPC 
Event 
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Figure 32: Overview of the Bow-tie-BN Model for the LOPC Event 
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3.3. Process Safety Indicators Integration 
Process safety indicators provide additional observations that refine the 
probability estimation of an event. Conceptually, the indicators measure the 
effectiveness or performance of the barrier or safeguard, and can represent as a factor 
added to the reliability of the barrier or safeguard. However, not all indicators are 
available for each of the barriers, as some activities are performed without collecting 
data as key performance indicators. The barriers can be categorized into three types, 
which are hardware, liveware, and software. Thus, an aggregation approach (M. J. 
Hassan, 2011; H. Pasman & Rogers, 2014) is adopted where the indicators are also 
grouped into three categories that match with the types of barriers. These groups of PSIs 
are mechanical integrity, operational integrity, and personnel integrity. Mechanical 
integrity impacts the effectiveness of the plant barriers or safeguards, which are physical 
or passive, such as pressure relief system, fire/blast wall, or painting. Operational 
integrity affects the procedural barriers, safeguards, or systems that require activation of 
safety system, such as a pressure trip system or a preventive maintenance program. 
Lastly, a personnel integrity group influences the probability of success of people 
barriers or safeguards such as a routine visual inspection and a thermography survey. By 
aggregating process safety indicators into three groups, causal links between the same 
types of barrier-indicator pairs can be done. Additionally, connecting three aggregated 
indicators to the top event is made to represent the causal impact from all barriers to the 
probability of occurrence of the top event. 
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In this study, 11 process safety indicators are used for updating of the probability 
of a LOPC event. A hierarchical framework for asset integrity proposed by Hassan & 
Khan was adopted (J. Hassan & Khan, 2012). The 11 indicators were individually 
compared to 279 indicators listed in Hassan’s thesis (M. J. Hassan, 2011) and 
categorized into mechanical integrity, operational integrity, or personnel integrity. All 
indicators fit into Hassan’s classification framework except for tier 1 LOPC, tier 2 
LOPC, tier 3 LOPC, and tier 4 LOPC, as these were not normally considered as an asset 
integrity indicator. Nonetheless, these LOPC indicators reflect a deterioration in all 
aspects of the asset integrity. Therefore, they are considered to be a part of all integrity 
types. Table 4 summarized the classification of the process safety indicators. 
As mentioned earlier, process safety indicators are used in the performance 
measurement of various barriers and safeguards installed on the platform. Each type of 
the indicator has a direct correlation with the same type of barrier/safeguard. In addition 
to the direct influence on the barriers/safeguards in place, the process safety integrity is 
also perceived as a precursor to the process safety event, which in this case is a LOPC. 
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Table 4: Process Safety Indicator Categorization 
Process Safety Indicator 
Process Safety Integrity 
Mechanical 
Integrity 
Operational 
Integrity 
Personnel 
Integrity 
Number of tier 1 LOPC Ö Ö Ö 
Number of tier 2 LOPC Ö Ö Ö 
Number of tier 3 LOPC Ö Ö Ö 
Number of failure on test or 
demand of SCE 
Ö   
Percentage of SCE backlog Ö   
Number of unplanned process 
shutdown 
 Ö  
Number of emergency blowdown  Ö  
Number of tier 4 LOPC Ö Ö Ö 
Percentage of contractor 
companies with approved safety 
plan 
  Ö 
Ratio of planned/unplanned 
maintenance 
Ö   
Number of deviation on SCE in 
place 
 Ö Ö 
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3.4. Prior Probability Definition 
The Bayesian network constructed from previous steps provides backbone of the 
diagram. Next, prior probability values are input into each node. For a purpose of 
developing a network for the quantitative analysis of different hazard identification 
methods, several assumptions were made to allow the analysis to be performed without 
having a burden in collecting myriad amount of real-time operating data. The same set of 
assumptions is applied to both HAZOP-BN and Bow-tie-BN models for consistency. 
Basis of the model is also outlined below: - 
• Time period of the study is considered to be one month; 
• The process safety indicator data is reported on a monthly basis, which is 
consistent with the time boundary of the model; 
• The rate of occurrence of any basic event is assumed to be one time per 
month. For example, overpressure scenario is assumed to have prior 
probability of 1 time per month. This prior probability is considered as a 
demand rate, which will be moderated further by the probability of failure 
on demand of the barriers or safeguards. Exceptions are made where the 
basic event does not have barriers or safeguards installed. In such cases, it 
is assumed that the rate of occurrence is Triangular(Min, Mode, Max) = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01x3); 
• Barriers and safeguards are categorized into three groups: hardware; 
software; and liveware; 
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• The probability of failure of barriers or safeguards is considered to be the 
probability of failure on demand of that specific equipment or system. 
Each type of barriers/safeguards group has the following probability of 
failure on demand value; 
o Hardware (equipment or passive system): 0.01; 
o Software (procedural control or active system): 0.01; 
o Liveware (human barrier): 0.1. 
• A triangular distribution is used to incorporate uncertainties in the point 
value given above. Thus, the following probability of failure on demand 
is obtained; 
o Hardware (equipment or passive system): Triangular(Min, Mode, 
Max) = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01x3); 
o Software (procedural control or active system): Triangular(Min, 
Mode, Max) = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01x3); 
o Liveware (human barrier): Triangular(Min, Mode, Max) = 
Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1x3). 
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For PSIs, additional steps are required to convert the basic information obtained 
from an energy company into the prior probabilities. Raw data are collected for each 
month of operation. Then, it is normalized by 100,000 man-hours to obtain the rate of 
occurrence based on hours of operation. This is done to avoid potential mistakes of a 
prediction when there are uncommon operations such as construction projects that 
happen in a particular month. Exceptions are made for percentage of SCE backlog, 
percentage of contractor with approved safety plan, ratio of planned/unplanned 
maintenance, and number of deviation on SCE in place. This is due to the nature of the 
indicators which does not conform to the basis of man-hour. Normalized data are given 
in Table 5 to Table 8.  
  66 
Table 5: Process Safety Indicator Data for Period 1-6 
Process Safety Indicator 
Period / Process Safety Indicator Rate Per 
100,000 Man-Hours 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of tier 1 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of tier 2 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of tier 3 LOPC 0.00 0.92 1.42 0.00 4.25 1.43 
Number of failure on test or 
demand of SCE 
0.00 0.00 2.83 9.70 14.2 9.98 
Percentage of SCE backlog 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of unplanned process 
shutdown 
0.93 1.83 2.83 4.16 2.84 4.28 
Number of emergency blowdown 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.42 0.00 
Number of tier 4 LOPC 0.93 2.75 1.42 5.54 5.67 4.28 
Percentage of contractor 
companies with approved safety 
plan 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Ratio of planned/unplanned 
maintenance 
3.04 1.74 2.04 2.88 3.34 1.47 
Number of deviation on SCE in 
place 
20 7 18 7 7 6 
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Table 6: Process Safety Indicator Data for Period 7-12 
Process Safety Indicator 
Period / Process Safety Indicator Rate Per 
100,000 Man-Hours 
7 8 9 10 11 12 
Number of tier 1 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of tier 2 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of tier 3 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 1.88 0.00 
Number of failure on test or 
demand of SCE 
1.38 4.50 3.12 2.75 3.13 2.56 
Percentage of SCE backlog 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of unplanned process 
shutdown 
6.91 13.5 1.25 2.75 1.25 6.39 
Number of emergency blowdown 1.38 0.00 0.00 1.38 0.00 2.56 
Number of tier 4 LOPC 5.53 6.01 1.87 1.84 2.51 5.11 
Percentage of contractor 
companies with approved safety 
plan 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Ratio of planned/unplanned 
maintenance 
1.87 2.83 1.89 7.36 3.04 4.07 
Number of deviation on SCE in 
place 
1 1 6 1 7 7 
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Table 7: Process Safety Indicator Data for Period 13-18 
Process Safety Indicator 
Period / Process Safety Indicator Rate Per 
100,000 Man-Hours 
13 14 15 16 17 18 
Number of tier 1 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of tier 2 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94 
Number of tier 3 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of failure on test or 
demand of SCE 
4.12 0.87 1.26 1.45 4.28 0.94 
Percentage of SCE backlog 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of unplanned process 
shutdown 
6.18 0.00 1.68 1.45 0.86 2.82 
Number of emergency blowdown 2.06 0.00 0.00 1.45 0.86 1.88 
Number of tier 4 LOPC 3.09 2.62 0.84 3.62 4.28 2.82 
Percentage of contractor 
companies with approved safety 
plan 
100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ratio of planned/unplanned 
maintenance 
2.14 2.59 1.78 1.90 2.19 2.15 
Number of deviation on SCE in 
place 
9 0 18 7 4 2 
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Table 8: Process Safety Indicator Data for Period 19-24 
Process Safety Indicator 
Period / Process Safety Indicator Rate Per 
100,000 Man-Hours 
19 20 21 22 23 24 
Number of tier 1 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of tier 2 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of tier 3 LOPC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of failure on test or 
demand of SCE 
0.91 9.62 0.00 2.24 2.66 0.00 
Percentage of SCE backlog 0.00 1.82 1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of unplanned process 
shutdown 
0.91 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.89 5.82 
Number of emergency blowdown 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.49 
Number of tier 4 LOPC 0.91 0.60 0.68 6.71 0.89 3.49 
Percentage of contractor 
companies with approved safety 
plan 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ratio of planned/unplanned 
maintenance 
2.31 2.07 5.09 4.53 4.56 1.20 
Number of deviation on SCE in 
place 
2 7 4 1 5 5 
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Then, for each indicator, a histogram was made to visualize the shape of the 
distribution. Sturges’ rule is applied for calculating the number of bin for the histogram. 
Since there are 24 data for 24 months reporting period, the total number of bin is six. 
Figure 33 demonstrates the histogram that was made for the number of unplanned 
process shutdown indicator. 
 
Equation 4: Sturges' Formula !"#$%&	()	$*+ = 	 log0 +"#$%&	()	1232 + 1 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Histogram of the Number of Unplanned Process Shutdown Indicator 
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After the histogram was made, a specific distribution was sought by mapping 
multiple distribution types to the histogram. Four types of distribution comprised of 
Exponential distribution, Gamma distribution, Weibull distribution, and Uniform 
distribution were pre-selected due to the characteristics of the histograms. Probability 
density functions for each of the distribution are given in Equation 5 to Equation 7. The 
sum of error squared method is performed for each type of distribution against the actual 
data. The distribution type that has the least value of the sum of error squared is selected. 
The analysis is done using Microsoft Excel 2016. The representative distribution for the 
number of unplanned process shutdown indicator is shown in Figure 34. 
 
Equation 5: Exponential(l) Probability Density Function ) 6; 	8 = 	8%9:; 
 
Equation 6: Gamma(a, b) Probability Density Function ) 6; 	<, > = 	 1>?Γ < 6?9A%9;B 
 
Equation 7: Weibull(a, b) Probability Density Function ) 6; 	<, > = 	 <>? 6?9A%9 ;B C 
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Figure 34: Histogram of the Number of Unplanned Process Shutdown Indicator and the 
Gamma Distribution 
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2.23, 2.23x3) and Triangular(5.43/3, 5.43, 5.43x3), respectively. Table 9 summarizes the 
prior distribution defined for each process safety indicator. 
In order to proceed to the next step of the study, the prior distributions of these 
PSIs are discretized into three classes; high, medium, and low. Each class is assigned 
with a point value as detailed below. It should be noted that these values are arbitrarily 
set for the purpose of the study and do not reflect the real effect on the barriers’ 
performances, which should be studied further in the future. 
• “High” class is assigned with the value of 1, i.e. representing strong 
performance and, consequently, would not alter the probability of failure 
on demand of the barrier/safeguard. The PSI values that exceed the mean 
plus 1 standard deviation are categorized into this class; 
• “Medium” class is assigned with the value of 0.9, i.e. representing 
average performance. The PSI values that are between the mean and 1 
standard deviation are categorized into this class; 
• “Low” class is assigned with the value of 0.5, i.e. representing poor 
performance. The PSI values that are below the mean minus 1 standard 
deviation are categorized into this class. 
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Table 9: Prior Distribution Defined for Each Process Safety Indicator 
Process Safety Indicator Representative Prior Distribution 
Number of tier 1 LOPC Triangular(2.23/3, 2.23, 2.23x3) 
Number of tier 2 LOPC Triangular(5.43/3, 5.43, 5.43x3) 
Number of tier 3 LOPC Gamma(0.5, 0.5) 
Number of failure on test or 
demand of SCE 
Weibull(2.5, 2) 
Percentage of SCE backlog Gamma(0.2, 0.3) 
Number of unplanned process 
shutdown 
Gamma(2.5, 0.6) 
Number of emergency blowdown Weibull(0.5, 0.12) 
Number of tier 4 LOPC Weibull(0.85, 2.5) 
Percentage of contractor 
companies with approved safety 
plan 
Uniform 
Ratio of planned/unplanned 
maintenance 
Weibull(1.8, 1.7) 
Number of deviation on SCE in 
place 
Exponential(0.3) 
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An indicators aggregation step is executed by adding up the value of specific 
indicators and dividing by the number of the indicator in the group to obtain the value 
between 0 and 1. For example, mechanical integrity group consists of seven process 
safety indicators. If six of the indicators are categorized in “high” class and one is in 
“low” class, then the mechanical integrity value is calculated as A D E F.H F E F.I AJ =0.9286. The BN model for the PSI aggregation is shown in Figure 35 to Figure 37. 
 
 
 
Figure 35: BN Model Illustrating the Aggregation of PSIs into Mechanical Integrity 
Element 
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Figure 36: BN Model Illustrating the Aggregation of PSIs into Operational Integrity 
Element 
 
 
 
Figure 37: BN Model Illustrating the Aggregation of PSIs into Personnel Integrity 
Element 
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The calculated mechanical integrity, operational integrity, and personnel integrity 
are integrated into the BN by dividing the probability of failure on demand of the barrier 
by the computed value. For example, the pressure relief system barrier from the Bow-tie-
BN model has the probability of failure on demand of Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01x3). 
The barrier is categorized as a hardware barrier. If the mechanical integrity is 0.5, that 
means the modified probability of failure on demand for the barrier will be doubled. 
To calculate the modified probability of failure on demand for the LOPC event, 
the mechanical integrity, operational integrity, and personnel integrity were combined 
using weight factor of 0.4, 0.34, and 0.26, respectively. These weight factor values are 
obtained from Hassan’s study (M. J. Hassan, 2011). Then, this number is applied as a 
denominator for the LOPC node. When combine with the arbitrary number defined for 
each of the integrities, it can be projected that low integrity level will double the 
probability of occurrence of LOPC, and medium, and high integrity will result in about 
10%, and 0% increase in the probability value, respectively. 
Figure 38 and Figure 39 represent the overall HAZOP-BN and Bow-tie-BN 
model, respectively. Defined equation for each of the node in the model is elaborated in 
Table 10 and Table 11. 
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Figure 38: Overview of the HAZOP-BN Model for the LOPC Event with PSIs Integration 
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Figure 39: Overview of the Bow-tie-BN Model for the LOPC Event with PSIs Integration 
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Table 10: Defined Equation for HAZOP-BN Model 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Air Recirculation Event Air_Recirculation = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) 
Blocked Outlet Event Blocked_Outlet = 1 - (1 - 
High_Reliability_Instrument_Air) * (1 - 
Operator_Training * Routine_Operator_Monitoring) 
Compressor 
Blowdown 
Software 
Barrier 
Compressor_Blowdown = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
Control of Ignition 
Sources 
Software 
Barrier 
Control_of_Ignition_Sources = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
Corrosion Event Corrosion = Sacrificial_Anodes * (1 - (1 - 
Routine_Corrosion_Monitoring) * (1 - 
ROV_Monitoring) * (1 - Intelligent_Pigging)) 
Discharge Cooler 
Fans Failure 
Event Discharge_Cooler_Fans_Failure = 
Preventive_Maintenance 
Emergency 
Response Plan 
Software 
Barrier 
Emergency_Response_Plan = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
Export Gas 
Compressor Trips 
Event Export_Gas_Compressor_Trips = 
Preventive_Maintenance 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Fire/Explosion Event Fire_Explosion = LOPC_HC_Gas * 
Control_of_Ignition_Sources * 
Passive_Fire_Protection * 
Emergency_Response_Plan 
Fully Rated 
Compressor 
Suction System 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Fully_Rated_Compressor_Suction_System = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Mechanical_Integrity 
Gas Blowby Due to 
Low Level of 
Separator 
Event Gas_Blowby_Due_to_Low_Level_of_Separator = 
Operator_Training * (1 - (1 - 
Preventive_Maintenance) * (1 - 
Routine_Operator_Monitoring)) 
High Pressure 
Downstream 
Event High_Pressure_Downstream = Blocked_Outlet 
High Pressure Drop 
Across Device 
Event High_Pressure_Drop_Across_Device = 1 - (1 - 
Operator_Training) * (1 - Material_Selection) 
High Pressure 
Upstream 
Event High_Pressure_Upstream = 
Export_Gas_Compressor_Trips * 
Two_Dissimilar_Check_Valves * Inlet_SDV_is_TSO 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
High Reliability 
Instrument Air 
Software 
Barrier 
High_Reliability_Instrument_Air = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Operational_Integrity 
High Temperature Event High_Temperature = (1 - (1 - 
Discharge_Cooler_Fans_Failure) * (1 - 
Air_Recirculation) * (1 - 
Hot_Exhaust_Gas_from_Turbines)) * 
Operator_Response_to_Cooler_Failure_Alarm * 
Temperature_Switch_to_Initiate_ESD 
Hot Exhaust Gas 
from Turbines 
Event Hot_Exhaust_Gas_from_Turbines = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) 
Inlet SDV is TSO Software 
Barrier 
Inlet_SDV_is_TSO = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
Intelligent Pigging Liveware 
Barrier 
Intelligent_Pigging = Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1*3) / 
Personnel_Integrity 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
LOPC HC Gas Event LOPC_HC_Gas = (1 - (1 - Overpressure) * (1 - 
Corrosion) * (1 - Third_Party_Impact) * (1 - 
High_Temperature) * (1 - 
Low_Temperature_Embrittlement)) / (0.4 * 
Mechanical_Integrity + 0.34 * Operational_Integrity 
+ 0.26 * Personnel_Integrity) 
Level Alarm Low Liveware 
Barrier 
Level_Alarm_Low = Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1*3) / 
Personnel_Integrity 
Level Switch to 
Initiate ESD 
Software 
Barrier 
Level_Switch_to_Initiate_ESD = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
Low Temperature 
Embrittlement 
Event Low_Temperature_Embrittlement = 
High_Pressure_Drop_Across_Device 
Material Selection Hardware 
Barrier 
Material_Selection = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) 
/ Mechanical_Integrity 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Mechanical 
Integrity 
Element 
Indicator 
Mechanical_Integrity = 
(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE_discretized + 
Percent_of_SCE_Backlog_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC_discretized + 
Ratio_of_PM_CM_discretized) / 7 
No of Deviation of 
SCE 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Deviation_of_SCE = Exponential(0.3) 
No of Deviation of 
SCE discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Deviation_of_SCE_discretized = 
If(No_of_Deviation_of_SCE < 0.1, 1, 
If(No_of_Deviation_of_SCE < 6.67, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Emergency 
Blowdown 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Emergency_Blowdown = Weibull(0.5, 0.12) 
No of Emergency 
Blowdown 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Emergency_Blowdown_discretized = 
If(No_of_Emergency_Blowdown < 0.01, 1, 
If(No_of_Emergency_Blowdown < 0.78, 0.9, 0.5)) 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
No of Failure on 
Demand of SCE 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE = Weibull(2.5, 
2) 
No of Failure on 
Demand of SCE 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE_discretized = 
If(No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE < 1.02, 1, 
If(No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE < 2.53, 0.9, 
0.5)) 
No of Tier 1 LOPC Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_1_LOPC = Triangular(0.7444, 2.2333, 
6.7) 
No of Tier 1 LOPC 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_1_LOPC_discretized = 
If(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC < 1.96, 1, 
If(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC < 4.49, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Tier 2 LOPC Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC = Triangular(1.8111, 5.4333, 
16.3) 
No of Tier 2 LOPC 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC_discretized = 
If(No_of_Tier_2_LOPC < 4.77, 1, 
If(No_of_Tier_2_LOPC < 10.93, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Tier 3 LOPC Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC = Gamma(0.5, 0.5) 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
No of Tier 3 LOPC 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC_discretized = 
If(No_of_Tier_3_LOPC < 0.01, 1, 
If(No_of_Tier_3_LOPC < 0.6, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Tier 4 LOPC Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC = Weibull(0.85, 2.5) 
No of Tier 4 LOPC 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC_discretized = 
If(No_of_Tier_4_LOPC < 0.1, 1, 
If(No_of_Tier_4_LOPC < 5.93, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Unplanned 
Process Shutdown 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown = Gamma(2.5, 
0.6) 
No of Unplanned 
Process Shutdown 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown_discretized = 
If(No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown < 0.55, 1, 
If(No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown < 2.45, 0.9, 
0.5)) 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Operational 
Integrity 
Element 
Indicator 
Operational_Integrity = 
(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown_discretized + 
No_of_Emergency_Blowdown_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Deviation_of_SCE_discretized) / 7 
Operator Response 
to Cooler Failure 
Alarm 
Liveware 
Barrier 
Operator_Response_to_Cooler_Failure_Alarm = 
Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1*3) / Personnel_Integrity 
Operator Training Software 
Barrier 
Operator_Training = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) 
/ Operational_Integrity 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Overpressure Event Overpressure = 1 - (1 - High_Pressure_Upstream * 
Pressure_Indicator_Alarm_High * 
Fully_Rated_Compressor_Suction_System * 
Compressor_Blowdown * 
PSV_for_Upstream_System) * (1 - 
High_Pressure_Downstream * 
Fully_Rated_Compressor_Suction_System * 
Pressure_Switch_to_Initiate_ESD) * (1 - 
Gas_Blowby_Due_to_Low_Level_of_Separator * 
Vessel_Designed_for_Blowby_Case * 
Pressure_Switch_to_Initiate_ESD * 
Level_Switch_to_Initiate_ESD * Level_Alarm_Low) 
PSV for Upstream 
System 
Hardware 
Barrier 
PSV_for_Upstream_System = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
Passive Fire 
Protection 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Passive_Fire_Protection = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Percent of 
Contractor with 
Approved Safety 
Plan 
Specific 
Indicator 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan 
= Uniform(0, 100) 
Percent of 
Contractor with 
Approved Safety 
Plan discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan 
_discretized = If((100 - 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan) 
/ 100 < 0.21, 1, If((100 - 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan) 
/ 100 < 0.8, 0.9, 0.5)) 
Percent of SCE 
Backlog 
Specific 
Indicator 
Percent_of_SCE_Backlog = Gamma(0.2, 0.3) 
Percent of SCE 
Backlog discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
Percent_of_SCE_Backlog_discretized = 
If(Percent_of_SCE_Backlog < 0.001, 1, 
If(Percent_of_SCE_Backlog < 0.19, 0.9, 0.5)) 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Personnel Integrity Element 
Indicator 
Personnel_Integrity = 
(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC_discretized + 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan 
_discretized + No_of_Deviation_of_SCE_discretized) 
/ 6 
Pressure Indicator 
Alarm High 
Liveware 
Barrier 
Pressure_Indicator_Alarm_High = Triangular(0.1/3, 
0.1, 0.1*3) / Personnel_Integrity 
Pressure Switch to 
Initiate ESD 
Software 
Barrier 
Pressure_Switch_to_Initiate_ESD = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Operational_Integrity 
Preventive 
Maintenance 
Software 
Barrier 
Preventive_Maintenance = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
ROV Monitoring Liveware 
Barrier 
ROV_Monitoring = Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1*3) / 
Personnel_Integrity 
Ratio of PM CM Specific 
Indicator 
Ratio_of_PM_CM = Weibull(1.8, 1.7) 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Ratio of PM CM 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
Ratio_of_PM_CM_discretized = 
If(Ratio_of_PM_CM > 2.38, 1, If(Ratio_of_PM_CM 
> 0.64, 0.9, 0.5)) 
Riser Guards Hardware 
Barrier 
Riser_Guards = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Mechanical_Integrity 
Routine Corrosion 
Monitoring 
Liveware 
Barrier 
Routine_Corrosion_Monitoring = Triangular(0.1/3, 
0.1, 0.1*3) / Personnel_Integrity 
Routine Operator 
Monitoring 
Liveware 
Barrier 
Routine_Operator_Monitoring = Triangular(0.1/3, 
0.1, 0.1*3) / Personnel_Integrity 
Sacrificial Anodes Hardware 
Barrier 
Sacrificial_Anodes = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) 
/ Mechanical_Integrity 
Temperature 
Switch to Initiate 
ESD 
Software 
Barrier 
Temperature_Switch_to_Initiate_ESD = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Operational_Integrity 
Third Party Impact Event Third_Party_Impact = Riser_Guards * 
Vessel_Permit_for_Exclusion_Zone 
Two Dissimilar 
Check Valves 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Two_Dissimilar_Check_Valves = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) * Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Mechanical_Integrity 
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Table 10 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Vessel Designed for 
Blowby Case 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Vessel_Designed_for_Blowby_Case = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Mechanical_Integrity 
Vessel Permit for 
Exclusion Zone 
Software 
Barrier 
Vessel_Permit_for_Exclusion_Zone = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Operational_Integrity 
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Table 11: Defined Equation for Bow-tie-BN Model 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Active Fire 
Protection 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Active_Fire_Protection = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
Control of Ignition 
Sources 
Software 
Barrier 
Control_of_Ignition_Sources = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
Corrosion Inhibitor 
Injection 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Corrosion_Inhibitor_Injection = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
Corrosion 
Monitoring 
Liveware 
Barrier 
Corrosion_Monitoring = Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1*3) 
/ Personnel_Integrity 
Corrosion Under 
Insulation 
Monitoring 
Software 
Barrier 
Corrosion_Under_Insulation_Monitoring = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Operational_Integrity 
Dropped Object 
Impact 
Event Dropped_Object_Impact = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) 
Emergency 
Blowdown 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Emergency_Blowdown = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
Emergency 
Response Plan 
Software 
Barrier 
Emergency_Response_Plan = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
Emergency 
Shutdown 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Emergency_Shutdown = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Equipment Seal 
Online Monitoring 
Software 
Barrier 
Equipment_Seal_Online_Monitoring = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Operational_Integrity 
External Corrosion Event External_Corrosion = External_Painting * (1 - (1 - 
Routine_Visual_Inspection) * (1 - 
Corrosion_Under_Insulation_Monitoring)) 
External Painting Hardware 
Barrier 
External_Painting = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Mechanical_Integrity 
Fire and Blast Wall Hardware 
Barrier 
Fire_and_Blast_Wall = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
Fire and Gas 
Detection System 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Fire_and_Gas_Detection_System = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Mechanical_Integrity 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Fire/Explosion Event Fire_Explosion = LOPC_HC_Gas * 
Fire_and_Blast_Wall * Control_of_Ignition_Sources 
* Active_Fire_Protection * Emergency_Shutdown *  
Emergency_Blowdown * Emergency_Response_Plan 
* PFP_on_Critical_Equipment * 
Life_Saving_Equipment * HVAC_System * 
Fire_and_Gas_Detection_System 
Flange Protector for 
Subsea Pipeline 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Flange_Protector_for_Subsea_Pipeline = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Mechanical_Integrity 
HVAC System Hardware 
Barrier 
HVAC_System = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Mechanical_Integrity 
Helicopter Crash Event Helicopter_Crash = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) 
Hydrocarbon 
Release Inspection 
Liveware 
Barrier 
Hydrocarbon_Release_Inspection = Triangular(0.1/3, 
0.1, 0.1*3) / Personnel_Integrity 
Intelligent Pigging Liveware 
Barrier 
Intelligent_Pigging = Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1*3) / 
Personnel_Integrity 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Internal Corrosion Event Internal_Corrosion = (1 - (1 - Intelligent_Pigging) * 
(1 - Corrosion_Monitoring) * (1 - Routine_NDT)) * 
Corrosion_Inhibitor_Injection 
Internal Erosion Event Internal_Erosion = Routine_NDT 
Joint Integrity 
Management 
System 
Software 
Barrier 
Joint_Integrity_Management_System = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Operational_Integrity 
LOPC HC Gas Event LOPC_HC_Gas = (1 - (1 - Internal_Corrosion) * (1 - 
External_Corrosion) * (1 - Overpressure) * (1 - 
Leakage_from_Flanges_and_Valves) * (1 - 
Mechanical_Failure) * (1 - Internal_Erosion) * (1 - 
Dropped_Object_Impact) * (1 - Structural_Failure) * 
(1 - Helicopter_Crash) * (1 - Ship_Collision) * (1 - 
Thermal_Stress_due_to_Sudden_Temperature_Chang
e)) / (0.4 * Mechanical_Integrity + 0.34 * 
Operational_Integrity + 0.26 * Personnel_Integrity) 
Leakage from 
Flanges and Valves 
Event Leakage_from_Flanges_and_Valves = 1 - (1 - 
Leakage_from_Subsea_Flanges_and_Valves) * (1 - 
Leakage_from_Topside_Flanges_and_Valves) 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Leakage from 
Subsea Flanges and 
Valves 
Event Leakage_from_Subsea_Flanges_and_Valves = 
ROV_Inspection * 
Flange_Protector_for_Subsea_Pipeline 
Leakage from 
Topside Flanges 
and Valves 
Event Leakage_from_Topside_Flanges_and_Valves = 1 - (1 
- Preventive_Maintenance_Program * 
Joint_Integrity_Management_System) * (1 - 
Preventive_Maintenance_Program * 
Hydrocarbon_Release_Inspection) * (1 - 
Joint_Integrity_Management_System * 
Hydrocarbon_Release_Inspection) 
Life Saving 
Equipment 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Life_Saving_Equipment = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Mechanical Failure Event Mechanical_Failure = 1 - (1 - 
Preventive_Maintenance_Program * 
Predictive_Maintenance_Program) * (1 - 
Preventive_Maintenance_Program * 
Equipment_Seal_Online_Monitoring) * (1 - 
Preventive_Maintenance_Program * 
Thermography_Survey) * (1 - 
Predictive_Maintenance_Program * 
Equipment_Seal_Online_Monitoring) * (1 - 
Predictive_Maintenance_Program * 
Thermography_Survey) * (1 - 
Equipment_Seal_Online_Monitoring * 
Thermography_Survey) 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Mechanical 
Integrity 
Element 
Indicator 
Mechanical_Integrity = 
(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE_discretized + 
Percent_of_SCE_Backlog_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC_discretized + 
Ratio_of_PM_to_CM_discretized) / 7 
No of Deviation of 
SCE 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Deviation_of_SCE = Exponential(0.3) 
No of Deviation of 
SCE discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Deviation_of_SCE_discretized = 
If(No_of_Deviation_of_SCE < 0.1, 1 , 
If(No_of_Deviation_of_SCE < 6.67, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Emergency 
Blowdown 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Emergency_Blowdown = Weibull(0.5, 0.12) 
No of Emergency 
Blowdown 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Emergency_Blowdown_discretized = 
If(No_of_Emergency_Blowdown < 0.01, 1, 
If(No_of_Emergency_Blowdown < 0.78, 0.9, 0.5)) 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
No of Failure on 
Demand of SCE 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE = Weibull(2.5, 
2) 
No of Failure on 
Demand of SCE 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE_discretized = 
If(No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE < 1.02, 1, 
If(No_of_Failure_on_Demand_of_SCE < 2.53, 0.9, 
0.5)) 
No of Tier 1 LOPC Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_1_LOPC = Triangular(0.7444, 2.2333, 
6.7) 
No of Tier 1 LOPC 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_1_LOPC_discretized = 
If(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC < 1.96, 1, 
If(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC < 4.49, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Tier 2 LOPC Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC = Triangular(1.8111, 5.4333, 
16.3) 
No of Tier 2 LOPC 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC_discretized = 
If(No_of_Tier_2_LOPC < 4.77, 1, 
If(No_of_Tier_2_LOPC < 10.93, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Tier 3 LOPC Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC = Gamma(0.5, 0.5) 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
No of Tier 3 LOPC 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC_discretized = 
If(No_of_Tier_3_LOPC < 0.01, 1, 
If(No_of_Tier_3_LOPC < 0.6, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Tier 4 LOPC Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC = Weibull(0.85, 2.5) 
No of Tier 4 LOPC 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC_discretized = 
If(No_of_Tier_4_LOPC < 0.1, 1, 
If(No_of_Tier_4_LOPC < 5.93, 0.9, 0.5)) 
No of Unplanned 
Process Shutdown 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown = Gamma(2.5, 
0.6) 
No of Unplanned 
Process Shutdown 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown_discretized = 
If(No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown < 0.55, 1, 
If(No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown < 2.45, 0.9, 
0.5)) 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Operational 
Integrity 
Element 
Indicator 
Operational_Integrity = 
(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Unplanned_Process_Shutdown_discretized + 
No_of_Emergency_Blowdown_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Deviation_of_SCE_discretized) / 7 
Overpressure Event Overpressure = Pressure_Relief_System * 
Pressure_Monitoring_System * 
Pressure_Trip_System 
PFP on Critical 
Equipment 
Hardware 
Barrier 
PFP_on_Critical_Equipment = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
Percent of 
Contractor with 
Approved Safety 
Plan 
Specific 
Indicator 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan 
= Uniform(0, 100) 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Percent of 
Contractor with 
Approved Safety 
Plan discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan 
_discretized = If((100 - 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan)  
/ 100 < 0.21, 1, If((100 - 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan) 
/ 100 < 0.8, 0.9, 0.5)) 
Percent of SCE 
Backlog 
Specific 
Indicator 
Percent_of_SCE_Backlog = Gamma(0.2, 0.3) 
Percent of SCE 
Backlog discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
Percent_of_SCE_Backlog_discretized = 
If(Percent_of_SCE_Backlog < 0.001, 1, 
If(Percent_of_SCE_Backlog < 0.19, 0.9, 0.5)) 
Personnel Integrity Element 
Indicator 
Personnel_Integrity = 
(No_of_Tier_1_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_2_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_3_LOPC_discretized + 
No_of_Tier_4_LOPC_discretized + 
Percent_of_Contractor_with_Approved_Safety_Plan 
_discretized + No_of_Deviation_of_SCE_discretized) 
/ 6 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Predictive 
Maintenance 
Program 
Software 
Barrier 
Predictive_Maintenance_Program = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) / 
Operational_Integrity 
Pressure 
Monitoring System 
Software 
Barrier 
Pressure_Monitoring_System = Triangular(0.01/3, 
0.01, 0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
Pressure Relief 
System 
Hardware 
Barrier 
Pressure_Relief_System = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Mechanical_Integrity 
Pressure Trip 
System 
Software 
Barrier 
Pressure_Trip_System = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 
0.01*3) / Operational_Integrity 
Preventive 
Maintenance 
Program 
Software 
Barrier 
Preventive_Maintenance_Program = 
Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3 / 
Operational_Integrity 
ROV Inspection Liveware 
Barrier 
ROV_Inspection = Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1*3) / 
Personnel_Integrity 
Ratio of PM to CM Specific 
Indicator 
Ratio_of_PM_to_CM = Weibull(1.8, 1.7) 
Ratio of PM to CM 
discretized 
Specific 
Indicator 
Ratio_of_PM_to_CM_discretized = 
If(Ratio_of_PM_to_CM > 2.38, 1, 
If(Ratio_of_PM_to_CM > 0.64, 0.9, 0.5)) 
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Table 11 Continued 
Node Type Defined Equation 
Routine NDT Liveware 
Barrier 
Routine_NDT = Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1*3) / 
Personnel_Integrity 
Routine Visual 
Inspection 
Liveware 
Barrier 
Routine_Visual_Inspection = Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 
0.1*3) / Personnel_Integrity 
Ship Collision Event Ship_Collision = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) 
Structural Failure Event Structural_Failure = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) 
Thermal Stress due 
to Sudden 
Temperature 
Change 
Event Thermal_Stress_due_to_Sudden_Temperature 
_Change = Triangular(0.01/3, 0.01, 0.01*3) 
Thermography 
Survey 
Liveware 
Barrier 
Thermography_Survey = Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 
0.1*3) / Personnel_Integrity 
Unignited HC Gas 
Cloud 
Event Unignited_HC_Gas_Cloud = LOPC_HC_Gas * 
Emergency_Shutdown * Emergency_Blowdown * 
Emergency_Response_Plan 
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3.5. Bayesian Network Algorithm 
Bayesian network calculations are performed using GeNIe V.2.1. The software 
was developed by the Decision Systems Laboratory, University of Pittsburgh in 1994, 
but is now owned by BayesFusion, LLC. As the constructed BN models are continuous 
type, the Monte Carlo simulation technique is adopted where 10,000 samplings are 
generated for each node. Hybrid Likelihood Weighing algorithm is selected by default in 
the software. The algorithm weighted each sample by the likelihood of evidence given 
the partial sample generated. It is considered to be superior than Logic Sampling method 
in case with observed evidence (GeNIe Modeler). 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Bayesian Networks (BNs) for LOPC of hydrocarbon gas scenario are developed 
following the methodology elaborated in Section 3. The first BN is constructed based on 
information provided by the HAZOP study from an energy company. The results from 
the HAZOP-BN model and their analyses are presented in Section 4.1. The second BN is 
developed from the Bow-tie study, which was also provided by an energy company. The 
results from the Bow-tie-BN model and their analysis are given in Section 4.2.  
 
4.1. HAZOP-BN Model Results 
The HAZOP-BN model is made with the GeNIe software. The structure of the 
model is as illustrated in Figure 38 in Section 3.4. Prior distribution is defined for each 
and every node in the model according to the type of the node. A complete list of 
equations inputted into the model is given in Table 10. For process safety indicators, 
prior distributions are calculated from the data gathered during 24 months from an 
energy company. A histogram of the number of unplanned process shutdown indicator 
simulated from the software is shown in Figure 40. Discretized distribution of this 
indicator is given in Figure 41. Approximately 70 percent of the indicator values are 
categorized as medium integrity whereas the rest of the values are equally categorized as 
low and high integrity, respectively. The mean integrity value for the indicator is 
approximately 0.85. The process is repeated for all other indicators. Statistical values for 
all indicators are given in Table 12. 
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Figure 40: Histogram Illustrating the Number of Unplanned Process Shutdown per 
Month on the X-Axis and the Probability of Occurrence on the Y-Axis 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Histogram Illustrating Discretized Distribution for Number of Unplanned 
Process Shutdown Indicator 
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Table 12: Process Safety Indicators Discretization Results 
Process Safety Indicator 
Statistical Value After Discretization 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of tier 1 LOPC 0.8465 0.1652 
Number of tier 2 LOPC 0.8432 0.1666 
Number of tier 3 LOPC 0.8655 0.1428 
Number of failure on test or 
demand of SCE 
0.8508 0.1604 
Percentage of SCE backlog 0.8980 0.1348 
Number of unplanned process 
shutdown 
0.8545 0.1513 
Number of emergency blowdown 0.8939 0.1229 
Number of tier 4 LOPC 0.8557 0.1374 
Percentage of contractor 
companies with approved safety 
plan 
0.8413 0.1747 
Ratio of planned/unplanned 
maintenance 
0.8541 0.1556 
Number of deviation on SCE in 
place 
0.8493 0.1389 
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The initial probability of occurrence of the LOPC of hydrocarbon gas is 
computed using discretized PSIs data mentioned earlier. The distribution of the initial 
probability is illustrated in Figure 42. Approximation to normal distribution is performed 
by the software and shown as a grey line overlapped onto the histogram. The shape of 
the LOPC histogram resembles the Triangular distribution of the prior distribution of the 
barrier nodes. However, a tendency to normal distribution is observed because of the 
differences in prior distribution values and because there are many nodes presented in 
the model. 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Initial Probability Distribution of the LOPC Event (Per Month) from the 
HAZOP-BN Model 
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The computed probability of the LOPC event ranges from 0.0152 to 0.1368 with 
the mean value of 0.0483, which denotes the number of occurrence of LOPC event in 
one month. It suggests that the LOPC event can be expected every 21 months based on 
the mean value. However, this figure should be analyzed with caution because many of 
the inputs are assumed values. Plant specific data should be collected and inputted into 
the model for a proper prediction and further use. Where plant specific data are not 
available, industry specific data may be used. 
The consistency of the software calculation is evaluated by performing multiple 
simulations with the same inputs. Table 13 shows the record for the mean and standard 
deviation values of initial probability of occurrence for the LOPC event for 10 trials. It 
shows that the mean values range from 0.0480 to 0.0484. Thus, around 1 percent 
aleatory uncertainty is expected from the software. This value is relatively small 
compared to the calculated standard deviation. Thus, the uncertainty from software 
sampling algorithm is reasonably acceptable. 
 
 
Table 13: Mean and Standard Deviation of the LOPC Event in HAZOP-BN Model after 
10 Trials 
Item 
Trial 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean 0.0483 0.0482 0.0481 0.0482 0.0480 0.0482 0.0481 0.0484 0.0482 0.0481 
SD 0.0133 0.0132 0.0131 0.0131 0.0133 0.0134 0.0133 0.0133 0.0133 0.0134 
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The posterior probabilities of LOPC event is calculated by providing specific 
indicator data from Table 5 to Table 8 as observation (or evidence) in the BN software. 
The GeNIe software equipped with a temporal plate function, which performs the 
calculation in a time step manner. However, this function is not available for continuous 
type BN. Therefore, the process is performed manually and repeated for 24 months. The 
results are extracted from the software to Microsoft Excel and shown in Figure 43.  
 
 
 
Figure 43: Posterior Probability of Occurrence of the LOPC Event from HAZOP-BN 
Model 
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The estimated mean values of an occurrence of the LOPC event are between 
0.0367 and 0.0574 times per month. The bracket extending from the dot represents one 
standard deviation from the mean value. By comparison, these values are not vastly 
different, mostly within one standard deviation from the previous month estimates. 
However, it should be noted that only changes in the PSI integrity level are taken into 
account. In real world operations, changing in number of occurrence of basic events such 
as overpressure and high temperature can be expected from month to month. 
Incorporating those changes into the BN model would yield more accurate estimation of 
the occurrence of the LOPC event. 
To observe a trend of the LOPC event, a six-month moving average is made and 
shown as a dotted line in Figure 43. It can be seen that the occurrence of LOPC is 
slightly decreasing, which means that the energy company has managed to reduce the 
process safety risk during the data collection period.  
In the developed model, the LOPC event is possible if any of its causes are true. 
There are five causes identified from the HAZOP study: overpressure, corrosion, third 
party impact, high temperature, and low temperature embrittlement. Although the exact 
contribution cannot be determined due to a complexity of the interrelationships in the 
model, the BN model allows identification of the most likely contributing factor by 
observing the probability of occurrence value from each cause node. The low 
temperature embrittlement is found to be the most likely contributing factor because of 
its minimal number of barriers in place and its fault tree structure. The software is 
equipped with sensitivity analysis function that can quantitatively categorize the degree 
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of influence of the target node, e.g., the LOPC event node, and thus the most likely 
contributing factor can be quickly identified. However, this function only works with the 
discrete type BN only. Nonetheless, the main focus here is that the BN model supports 
the analysis of the major contributors, either manually or automatically, so that incident 
prevention actions can be performed to reduce the likelihood of the top event. 
 
4.2. Bow-tie-BN Model Results 
The Bow-tie-BN model is made with the GeNIe software. The structure of the 
model is illustrated in Figure 39 in Section 3.4. Prior distribution was defined for each 
and every node in the model according to the type of the node. A complete list of 
equations input into the model is given in Table 11. For process safety indicators, the 
same inputs as the HAZOP-BN model were used. Discretization is performed in the 
same manner and incorporated into the Bow-tie-BN model. 
The initial probability of occurrence of the LOPC of hydrocarbon gas is 
computed using the discretized PSIs data mentioned earlier. The distribution of the 
initial probability is illustrated in Figure 44. Approximation to normal distribution is 
performed by the software and shown as a grey line overlapping with the histogram. 
Similar to the analysis for HAZOP-BN model, the shape of the LOPC histogram from 
Bow-tie-BN model resembles the Triangular distribution of the prior distribution of the 
barrier nodes. 
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Figure 44: Initial Probability Distribution of the LOPC Event (Per Month) from the 
Bow-tie-BN Model 
 
 
The computed probability of LOPC event ranges from 0.1280 to 0.7560 with the 
mean value of 0.2966, which denotes the number of occurrence of the LOPC event in 
one month. It suggests that the LOPC event can be expected every three months based 
on the mean value. However, this figure should be analyzed with caution because many 
of the inputs are assumed values. Plant specific data should be collected and inputted 
into the model for proper prediction and further use. Where plant specific data are not 
available, industry specific data may be used instead. This analysis is in-line with the 
one performed for the HAZOP-BN model in the previous section. 
From Figure 29, it shows that the internal erosion cause has only one barrier 
installed, which is a routine NDT. The barrier is categorized as a liveware, which has the 
probability of failure on demand of Triangular(0.1/3, 0.1, 0.1x3). The mean value of the 
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internal erosion event is calculated as 0.1714, which is significantly large compared to 
the mean value of the LOPC event of 0.2966. Therefore, with the assumption that one 
internal erosion occurred in a month, the shape of the distribution shown in Figure 44 is 
influenced by the shape of this routine NDT barrier. 
The consistency of the software calculation is evaluated by performing multiple 
simulations with the same inputs. Table 14 shows the record for the mean and standard 
deviation values of initial probability of occurrence for the LOPC event for 10 trials. It 
shows that the mean values range from 0.2947 to 0.2968. Thus, around 1 percent 
aleatory uncertainty is expected from the software. This value is relatively small 
compared to the calculated standard deviation. Thus, the uncertainty from the software 
sampling algorithm is reasonably acceptable. 
 
 
Table 14: Mean and Standard Deviation of the LOPC Event in Bow-tie-BN Model after 
10 Trials 
Item 
Trial 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean 0.2966 0.2959 0.2949 0.2956 0.2966 0.2968 0.2961 0.2962 0.2947 0.2957 
SD 0.0831 0.0817 0.0823 0.0807 0.0827 0.0831 0.0831 0.0830 0.0825 0.0812 
 
 
The posterior probabilities of the LOPC event is calculated by providing specific 
indicator data from Table 5 to Table 8 as an observation (or an evidence) in the BN 
software. The temporal plate function in GeNIe software is not available for a 
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continuous type BN as explained in Section 4.1. Therefore, the process is performed 
manually and repeated for the 24 months. The results are extracted from the software to 
Microsoft Excel and shown in Figure 45. 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Posterior Probability of Occurrence of the LOPC Event from Bow-tie-BN 
Model 
 
 
The estimated mean values of occurrence of the LOPC event are between 0.2433 
and 0.3292 times per month. The bracket extending from a dot represents one standard 
deviation from the mean value. By comparison, these values are not vastly different, 
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mostly within one standard deviation from the previous month’s estimates. However, it 
should be noted here, same as the HAZOP-BN model, that only changes in the PSI 
integrity level are taken into account. In real world operation, changes in number of 
occurrence of basic events such as internal corrosion or dropped object impact would be 
changing from month to month. Incorporating those changes into the BN model would 
yield more accurate estimations of the occurrence of the LOPC event. 
To observe a trend in the estimated probability of occurrence of the LOPC event, 
a six-month moving average is made and shown as a dotted line in Figure 45. It can be 
seen that the occurrence of LOPC is slightly decreasing and almost leveled in the second 
12-month period. 
There are 11 causes identified in the Bow-tie study that lead to the LOPC event: 
internal corrosion, external corrosion, overpressure, leakage from flanges and valves, 
mechanical failure, internal erosion, dropped object impact, structural failure, helicopter 
crash, ship collision, and thermal stress due to sudden temperature change. The LOPC 
event is possible if any of it causes is true. Identification of the most likely contributing 
factor is manually performed by observing the probability of occurrence value for each 
of the cause. As mentioned earlier, the internal erosion is found to be the most likely 
contributing factor because it has only one barrier linked to it. However, it may not be 
the case if real data is used, since the cause with few barriers could mean that they have 
a very low probability of occurrence per month in the beginning. Thus, each cause of the 
LOPC event should be thoroughly inspected to identify which cause has the largest 
contribution to the top event. 
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4.3. Comparison Between HAZOP-BN and Bow-tie-BN Model 
The predicted probability of occurrence of the LOPC event from both HAZOP-
BN and Bow-tie-BN model are shown in Figure 46. The blue color represents the result 
from the HAZOP-BN and is to be read with the left axis. The red color represents the 
result from the Bow-tie-BN and is to be read with the right axis. Even though the BNs 
were constructed based on different studies, the results are considerably in line with each 
other. The standard deviation brackets extend from the mean value point also have 
approximately the same length. The numerical analysis is performed. It indicates that the 
standard deviation value is approximately 25 percent of the mean value for both 
HAZOP-BN and Bow-tie-BN.  
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Figure 46: Posterior Probability of Occurrence of the LOPC Event from HAZOP-BN 
and Bow-tie-BN Model 
 
 
Examining the absolute mean value obtained from both models, the result from 
Bow-tie-BN is almost 6 times higher than the result from HAZOP-BN model. There are 
many explanations that could contribute to such a large gap. Firstly, there are fewer 
causes identified from the HAZOP study because only one node, the export gas 
compressor system, is analyzed in this study; while from the Bow-tie study, 11 causes 
are identified. With the same set of assumptions, 11 causes from the Bow-tie study 
should double the probability of occurrence predicted when compared to 5 causes from 
the HAZOP study. Secondly, in the HAZOP-BN model, at least 2 barriers are attached to 
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each cause, while in the Bow-tie-BN model, the internal erosion has only 1 barrier 
attached to it. This internal erosion cause is considered to be the largest contributor to 
the probability of occurrence of the LOPC event from the Bow-tie-BN model as 
explained in Section 4.2. In addition, five other causes in the Bow-tie-BN model namely: 
dropped object impact, structural failure, helicopter crash, ship collision, and thermal 
stress due to sudden temperature change, do not have any barrier at all. This is because 
those five causes are identified as a top event in other Bow-tie diagrams, which can be 
expanded into other BN models. However, to reduce the complexity of the model, the 
extension into other Bow-tie diagrams is not considered in this study. Lastly, the 
differences between the same barrier type in HAZOP-BN and Bow-tie-BN model should 
be addressed in a real application. For example, the PSV for upstream system barrier in 
HAZOP-BN model and the pressure relief system barrier in the Bow-tie-BN model, 
both, prevent overpressure scenario. However, the barrier in the HAZOP-BN model only 
consider the probability of failure for the PSV installed in the export gas compressor 
system, while the barrier in the Bow-tie-BN model considers the whole pressure relief 
system of the facility, from the PSVs to pressure relief piping, and flare system. 
Therefore, the same probability of failure on demand applied to both barriers may not 
reflect the most accurate value for the real world situation.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
The Bayesian network (BN) method enables traditional hazard identification and 
risk assessment techniques to update their probability and risk values by incorporating 
new observations or information. In this study, the BN method was applied to both 
HAZOP and Bow-tie studies to estimate the probability of occurrence of a loss of 
primary containment (LOPC) event using process safety indicator data. Integration of 
multiple indicators into the developed BN model is made possible by indicators 
aggregation method, which combined multiple specific indicators into three element 
indicators. The LOPC of high pressure hydrocarbon gas from the export gas compressor 
system is selected as a representative scenario for this research. Continuous type BN is 
selected because it can accommodate a complex and large scale system without the 
burden of the conditional probability table, which is needed for the discrete type BN. 
The Bayesian estimation requires tremendous amount of data to perform a 
posterior probability estimation. Set of assumptions are provided for prior probabilities 
and conditional probabilities definition to allow computation and analysis of the study. 
The estimated probabilities of occurrence of the LOPC from the HAZOP-BN model are 
found to be between 0.0367 and 0.0574 times per month, while the prediction from 
Bow-tie-BN model are between 0.2433 and 0.3292 times per month. The differences in 
the computed probabilities from the two models are due to: 1) differences in number of 
causes for the LOPC event; 2) differences in number of barrier for each cause; and 3) 
differences in the definition of the barrier in place. Therefore, the predicted probabilities 
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of occurrence of the LOPC event do not reflect the most accurate value. Albeit 
dissimilarities in terms of hazard identification approaches and the BN development 
process are presented, the results from both models show consistency in the pattern and a 
slightly decreasing trend toward the second year. The effects from process safety 
indicator data is found to be approximately in the same level. Therefore, both HAZOP-
BN and Bow-tie-BN methods are reasonably acceptable. A company that currently has 
HAZOP or Bow-tie method practiced in its risk management can further adopt BN 
model to incorporate process safety indicator data and enhance their risk assessment 
capability. 
In conclusion, this study demonstrates the method to incorporate process safety 
indicators into a probability estimation of a process safety event. The consequence 
analysis is excluded from the scope of this research. Therefore, it is prudent to explore 
the BN application in the consequence analysis to fulfil the second element of risk and 
obtain the overview of the dynamic risk assessment. In addition, more information 
should be incorporated into the BN, such as additional process safety indicators, 
operational process parameters, human error data, and safety culture. In order to achieve 
more accurate risk estimations, systematic data collection should be set up to collect 
company/plant specific data, which will be used for the prior probability definition of the 
fundamental elements and the conditional probability between them. The ultimate goal is 
to be able to identify weaknesses in the system such that preventive measures can be 
taken before incidents can be realized. 
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